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The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision:
How Should the Law Measure Inflation?
by
JIM CHEN*
I. Wobbly Times Are Here Again
Inflation, that old economic scourge, will someday ride again.
Two decades of robust, "non-inflationary growth" have abruptly
stopped, casting into sudden doubt whether the United States can
remain "at the world productivity frontier in many industries."' As
the prospect of "a new era of greater economic prosperity and
possibility" fades with each dot-coin mirage and each shocking
corporate scandal, cautious Americans must question how quickly
their country will reverse what had been a period of "sustained
economic strength with low inflation., 2 The hope that the United
States economy might have transcended macroeconomic cycles is
reminiscent of the "childish illusions that dominate[] elementary
mathematics. '  But when the mind finally comprehends the
intractable complexity of macroeconomics, economic optimism, "like
first love [and] elementary mathematics[,] passes into memory."4
Of late the principal macroeconomic concern in the United
States has not been inflation, but its opposite, deflation. For the first
time since the Great Depression, the United States is facing a
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1. ANDREA BASSANINI, KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
RECENT EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES 3 (2000).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN., DIGITAL
ECONOMY 2000, at v (2000).
3. DAVID BERLINSKI, A TOUR OF THE CALCULUS 239 (1995).
4. Id.
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substantial risk of a general decline in prices. The United States'
most formidable economic rivals have begun amassing their own
experience with deflation. The Ja panese economy has been mired in
deflation since the mid-1990s; while Germany "looks more
susceptible to deflation than America."6 Federal Reserve chairman
Alan Greenspan has spoken overtly of the dangers of sustained
deflation,' undoubtedly aware of the liquidity trap that could snap as
the Fed drives nominal interest rates closer to zero.' Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow's weapon of choice to boost a sagging
economy consists of a deliberate policy of allowing the dollar to fall
against foreign currencies, especially the euro. Of course, "[a] lower
dollar and lower interest rates both tend to increase inflation."'"
Economic prudence, whether at the highest policymaking levels or in
modest households, therefore dictates preparedness for rising as well
as falling prices.1"
Price instability, in either direction, should remind Americans
that the United States is not immune to economic cycles.
"Unfortunately,... ours is not an inflation-free economy."' 2 "While
the administrative convenience of ignoring inflation has some appeal
when inflation rates are low, to ignore inflation when the rates are
high is to ignore economic reality."" Few areas of law can completely
escape inflation, and inflation withers what it touches. To say the
least, "[m]any statutes have become anachronistic because they use
figures and sums rendered ridiculous by inflation."' 4 We may soon
5. See The Joy of Inflation, ECONOMIST, May 17,2003, at 11.
6. Hear That Hissing Sound?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 61, 62.
7. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Greenspan, Broadly Positive, Spells Out Deflation
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,2003, at C1, C2.
8. See Daniel Altman, Fed Is Starting to Fret over Falling Prices, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2003, at C1, C6; cf Hal R. Varian, How to Deal with Deflation? That Depends on What Is
Causing Prices to Fall, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at C2 (arguing that falling prices from
insufficient demand are far more worrisome than deflation due to excess supply).
9. See David Leonhardt & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Calculatingly, U.S. Tolerates Dollar's
Fall, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C1.
10. Id. at C4. But cf David Leonhardt, Greenspan Is Upbeat on Economy and Stirs
Hopes of More Rate Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at Cl (noting Federal Reserve chairman
Alan Greenspan's belief that inflation is not a major concern and suggesting that the Fed
may be willing to cut short-term interest rates even further).
11. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Are You Ready for Deflation?, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2003, at D1
(observing that individual investors "must make a fundamental call on whether the economy
is headed toward falling prices or rising prices"); cf. Virginia Postrel, Just Because Prices Are
Falling, It Doesn't Mean There's Deflation, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at C2 (warning that
falling prices, especially if confined to certain industries and markets, do not amount to
economy-wide deflation).
12. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523,538 (1983).
13. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 462 U.S. at 541.
14. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 66 (1982).
1376 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
discover the extent to which "[t]he economy of the United States
[lacks] ... the institutional relationships that permit it to exist
moderately well with inflation."15  In tumultuous economic times,
therefore, the law must return to a question that has, practically
speaking, skipped a generation: How should the law measure
inflation?
Two decades ago, legal scholars might have been able to answer
this question more easily. Legal analysis of inflation reached its
apogee with the 1982 publication of Keith S. Rosenn's Law and
Inflation,'6 the leading academic examination of what had been the
dominant economic phenomenon of the previous decade. Professor
Rosenn's treatise, which remains the definitive study of inflation's
impact on the law, all but settled the question of inflation's
measurement in private law settings. In those instances where
contracting parties have anticipated inflation and wish to negotiate
terms to minimize its impact on their expectations, those
"parties... should remain free" not only to decide whether to index
for inflation but also "to link their contracts to any index or subindex"
of their choice once they have elected indexation.'7 "It seems
senseless to interfere with freedom of contract to secure an illusory
uniformity."' 8  To be sure, federal law does acknowledge the
potentially objectionable use of price indexes in automatic rent
increase clauses that prevent renters from anticipating actual
increases in rent over the term of a residential lease.' Most other
laws addressing the private use of official price indexes, however,
seek to facilitate this sort of private ordering. Under conditions
stipulated by Congress, taxpayers0 and federally insured mortgage
lenders2' may use official price indexes to anticipate and
accommodate inflation.
The proper scope of judicial intervention in other circumstances
is equally easy to define. Judicial discretion to soften inflation's
corrosive effects on private dealings is firmly established within civil
15. D. Gale Johnson, Inflation, Agricultural Output, and Productivity, 62 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 917, 920 (1980).
16. KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION (1982).
17. Id. at 394.
18. Id.
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3603(2), 3608(a)(3), 3608(b)(3) (2000).
20. See I.R.C. §467(b)(5)(A) (2000) (exempting rental agreements using permitted
"changes in amounts paid determined by reference to price indices" from restrictions on
"disqualified leaseback or long-term agreements"); id. § 472(f) (requiring the promulgation
of Treasury regulations "permitting the use of suitable published governmental indexes" in
taxpayers' last-in, first-out inventories).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-10(a), (c) (2000).
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law traditions.22 Introducing similar flexibility into American law
simply requires an imaginative extension of the common law principle
permitting changes in currency within a contract as long as the change
constitutes a substantial equivalent and is commercially reasonable.23
Acknowledging the effect of inflation on commercial contracts,
William Eskridge has suggested that the law of sales might be
interpreted to shield settled expectations against unanticipated
monetary change. 4
But what approach to inflation should govern the rest of a legal
system whose common law foundations have been overrun by
statutory law?25 Although some statutes have attained so much
institutional significance, normative influence, and social meaning
that they should be considered quasiconstitutional,26  statutes
prescribing precise monetary formulas or even fixed dollar figures
typically lie at the opposite end of this spectrum. Any legislatively
fixed number, so it seems, commands unconditional judicial
acquiescence: absent a scrivener's error, courts cannot contest a
number stipulated in a statute. Whatever power courts may have in
other settings to forestall statutory obsolescence through dynamic
interpretation,27 judges are mostly impotent to adjust numbers or
quantitative formulas engraved directly into a statute. Indeed, the
mere notion that "a court [might] com[e] along after [a] stealth fighter
appropriations bill is enacted and arbitrarily add[] a billion dollars to
it on the ground that the extra money is needed to effectuate
22. See, e.g., PAUL ORTMANN, DIE GESCHAFrSGRUNDLAGE, EIN NEUER
RECHTSBEGRIFF (1921); ROSENN, supra note 16, at 72-97; John P. Dawson, Effects of
Inflation on Private Contracts in Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171, 181-85 (1934);
John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1039,
1045-46 (1983); Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 9-10 (1997);
Edward A. Tomlinson, Judicial Lawmaking in a Code Jurisdiction: A French Saga on
Certainty of Price in Contract Law, 58 LA. L. REV. 101, 102 (1997).
23. See, e.g., United Equities Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6, 12 (App. Div.
1976).
24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1521 & n.164 (1987) (citing U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302, which respectively impose a duty of
good faith on all commercial contracts and permit the avoidance of unconscionable terms in
sales contracts).
25. Cf. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist. Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983) (saying of statutory interpretation that "nothing
else as important in the law receives so little attention" (footnote omitted)).
26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statues, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996).
27. See ESKRIDGE, supra note *; Eskridge, supra note 24.
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Congress's policy of having an effective stealth fighter plane defense
system" may well define the extreme frontier of the legally "absurd.,
2
Even Professor Rosenn confined his comprehensive study to
"contracts, damages, and taxation" and consciously omitted other
"important aspects of law and inflation, such as wage and price
controls, trusts and estates, and public utility rate regulation.,
29
Without purporting to achieve in a single law review article what the
leading scholar of law and inflation left untouched in a monumental
treatise, this article will address the proper measure of inflation in
areas of law that are more amenable to legislative or administrative
prescription than judicial elaboration. In matters involving inflation,
after all, "[t]he legislative branch ... is far better equipped than [the
courts] are to perform a comprehensive economic analysis to fashion
the proper general rule."' This article will confine itself to four
relatively modest tasks. First, this article will distinguish inflation
from related economic concepts. Second, it will describe inflation's
impact on the law. Third, this article will criticize the federal
government's most frequently adopted method of measuring
inflation. Finally, this article will suggest ways to fix the problem.
Part II of this article provides a very brief comparison of inflation
rates with discount rates and purchasing power parity. I then discuss
how legal responses to inflation can affect a wide range of interests,
some of which transcend the strictly economic realm. Part III focuses
on manifestations of this phenomenon in three discrete areas of
public law: taxation, constitutional law, and rate regulation. In part
IV, I identify serious drawbacks in Congress's preferred method of
accommodating macroeconomic volatility. This analysis rests on a
detailed comparison of the Consumer Price Index with the Implicit
Price Deflator derived from the Gross Domestic Product. Part V
concludes by suggesting potential solutions for flawed legal measures
of inflation.
II. Inflation and Allied Economic Principles
Inflation, which merely measures the tendency of prices to rise
over time, can be confused with two related concepts: the discount
rate and purchasing power parity. As an initial matter, it behooves us
to distinguish these allied principles.
28. Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. CINC. L.
REV. 911,923 (1996).
29. ROSENN, supra note 16, at xxxviii.
30. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 551 (1983).
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A. Interest and Discount Rates
What is casually called "interest" in fact reflects the time value of
money. Discount rates measure the speed with which discrete
individuals or the market at large devalue a fixed sum over time.
Wholly independent of inflation, any rational person values a promise
to pay a dollar next year less than a promise to pay a dollar right
away. Wimpy's offer to Popeye-"I would gladly pay you Tuesday
for a hamburger today"-is always a bad deal, which may explain why
Popeye never accepted the bargain. Some truly intractable problems
of intergenerational equity arise from the fact that discount rates
differ among individuals." At their most irrational, human beings on
occasion appear to apply negative discount rates.32
Adding inflation to discount rates creates an exceedingly tangled
mess. The computation of damages based on future earnings lost
because of disabling injury or death represents a paradigmatic
instance of this problem.3 In the 1983 case of Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Pfeifer," the Supreme Court confronted a controversy over
compensation for earnings lost by a longshoreman covered by section
4 of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.35
The Court prescribed a two-step process for calculating the proper
amount of damages; both steps included some consideration of
inflation.36 "The first stage of the calculation require[s] an estimate of
the shape of the lost stream of future income."37 For workers who
enjoy a "'cost-of-living adjustment," the employment contract
"provides a basis for taking [price inflation] into account ... in
estimating ... lost future earnings.,
38
"The second stage of the calculation requires the selection of an
appropriate discount rate."39  That process in turn demands an
31. For a lucid introduction to these issues, see generally Daniel A. Farber & Paul A.
Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993).
32. See, e.g., Maureen L. Cropper, Sema K. Aydede & Paul R. Portney, Discounting
Human Lives, 73 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1410, 1412 (1991); Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra
note 31, at 284; John K. Horowitz & Richard T. Carson, Discounting Statistical Lives, 3 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 403,410 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1193-94 (1997).
33. See generally Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, The Problem of Inflation and the Offset
"Solution" in Tort Damage Awards, 18 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 51 (1987); Michael I. Krauss &
Robert A. Levy, Calculating Tort Damages for Lost Future Earnings: The Puzzles of Tax,
Inflation and Risk, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 325, 341-47 (1995-96).
34. 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (2000).






understanding of how "anticipated price inflation.., affects market
rates of return., 40 "[M]arket interest rates include two components-
an estimate of anticipated inflation, and a desired 'real' rate of return
on investment., 4' According to Jones & Laughlin, "the relevant real
interest rate is the difference between the short-term market interest
rate in a given year and the average rate of price inflation during that
year., 42 By the terms of the so-called Fisher identity, r = i - p, the real
yield on money is equivalent to the nominal yield minus the inflation
rate.43  The whole problem with this inquiry, however, is that it
assumes that the real rate of return "is essentially constant over
time."" The Supreme Court openly admitted that evidence of the
stability of real interest rates over time was at best "distinctly
inconclusive., 45  In terms of economic theory, the absence of
empirical confirmation is hardly surprising. Real interest rates are
not stable because changes in expectations of inflation lag behind
changes in inflation itself. 6
Describing the nature of the relationship of inflation with
discount rates is a straightforward proposition. "The current cost of
capital, whether debt or equity, never includes a risk premium for
past inflation. Only anticipated inflation, not already experienced
inflation, is reflected in a market-determined cost of debt or equity
capital., 47  Actually prescribing a workable way out of the mess is a
40. Id. at 538-39.
41. Id. at 542.
42. Id. at 542 n.26; see also Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39
n.10 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally John A. Carlson, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of
Inflation: A Comment, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 469 (1977); Eugene F. Fama, Interest Rates an
Inflation: The Message in the Entrails, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 487 (1977); William E. Gibson,
Interest Rates and Inflationary Expectations: New Evidence, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 854 (1972);
Jerome Sherman, Projection of Economic Loss: Inflation v. Present Value, 14 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 723,731-32 (1981).
43. See generally, e.g., William J. Crowder & Dennis L. Hoffman, The Long-Run
Relationship Between Nominal Interest Rates and Inflation: The Fisher Equation Revisited, 28
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 102 (1996); Shmuel Kandel, Aharon R. Ofer, & Oded H.
Sarig, Real Interest Rates and Inflation: An Ex-Ante Empirical Analysis, 51 J. FIN. 205
(1996); Zisimos Koustas & Apostolos Serletis, On the Fisher Effect, 44 J. MONETARY ECON.
105 (1999).
44. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 542.
45. Id. at 548 & n.30.
46. See IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 43 (1930).
47. J. Rhoads Foster, Fair Return Criteria and Estimation, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 883, 930-
31 (1976); accord Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. FERC, 654 F.2d 435, 443 n.20 (5th Cir.
1981); see also Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 539 n.23 ("Since all relevant effects of inflation
on the market interest rate will have occurred at that time, future changes in the rate of price
inflation will have no effect on [a future] stream of income [derived from a bundle of bonds
with different maturity dates but purchased at a single point in the past]."); Farmers Union
Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1524 n.71 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he inflation
July 2003]
different matter. Mindful "that the most detailed inquiry can at best
produce an approximate result,"4 the Court in Jones & Laughlin
declined to "establish" a single rule "for all time as the exclusive
method in all federal trials for calculating an award for lost earnings
in an inflationary economy.
4 9
B. Purchasing Power Parity
Measures of inflation are closely tied to the computation of
purchasing power parity (PPP). 0 Purchasing power parity is an
essential conceptual tool in any body of law dealing with economic
transactions involving more than one currency.' PPP reflects the
number of currency units required to buy the market basket of goods
and services that can be bought with one unit of a base country's
currency (often called the "numeraire"). PPP outperforms the
market exchange rate in measuring the price of a good or service in
one country relative to its price in another country. At best the
exchange rate reflects the relative price of tradeable commodities, a
category that excludes some goods and many services.
Purchasing power comparisons arise in a surprising number of
circumstances. Astute New Yorkers have long noticed that the price
of a subway ride follows that of a slice of pizza. 2 Although the
component of the rate of return should compensate investors for expected future inflation,
not past inflation").
48. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 552.
49. Id. at 546; see also id. at 552-53 (directing the court on remand to "make a deliberate
choice" among methods for "discounting the estimated stream of future earnings .. rather
than assuming that it is bound by a rule of state law").
50. See Nanno Mulder, The Measurement in Distribution, Transport, and
Communications: The ICOP Approach Applied to Brazil, Mexico, France, and the United
States, in INTERNATIONAL AND INTERAREA COMPARISONS OF INCOME, OUTPUT, AND
PRICES 279, 285-87 (Alan Heston & Robert E. Lipsey eds., 1999). The information in the
balance of this paragraph is derived from this source. For more detailed and formal
discussions of PPP, see ANGUS MADDISON & HARRY VAN OOSTSTROOM, THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF VALUE ADDED, PRODUCTIVITY, AND PURCHASING
POWER PARITIES IN AGRICULTURE (1993) (Research Memorandum GD1, Groningen
Growth & Development Centre); NANNO MULDER & ANGUS MADDISON, THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE IN DISTRIBUTION: VALUE ADDED,
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND PURCHASING POWER PARITIES IN MEXICAN AND U.S.
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE L975/77 (1993) (Research Memorandum GD2,
Groningen Growth & Development Centre). Both of these papers are available from the
Groningen Growth and Development Centre at the University of Groningen, The
Netherlands, at http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/workpap.shtml.
51. For an exemplary use of PPP statistics in economic forecasting on an international
scale, see Anne Marie Guide & Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, Purchasing Power Parity Based
Weights for the World Economic Outlook, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF
STUDIES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (1993).
52. See George Fasel, If You Understand Pizza, You Understand Subway Fares, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1985, at 27; Clyde Haberman, Beware the Price of a Slice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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Metropolitan Transit Authority has retired the subway token after 50
years, a recent fare increase from $1.50 to $2 has "reinstate[d]
the ... economic axiom.., that in New York the subway fare almost
always mirrors the cost of a slice."5
With equal frivolity but vastly greater ambition, The Economist
uses the price of a Big Mac at McDonald's restaurants in different
countries to test the efficiency with which international exchange
rates equalize the price of a market basket of goods and services:"
Dividing the American price of a Big Mac by the foreign price implies
a Big Mac PPP exchange rate, or "McParity." Comparing McParity
with market exchange rates suggests the extent to which a currency is
overvalued or undervalued. A country where it costs more to buy a
Big Mac than in the United States has a currency that is overvalued in
international capital markets. By contrast, the currency of a country
where Big Macs cost less than they do in America is undervalued.
The Big Mac index simultaneously exploits and tests the
economic assumptions underlying the PPP concept. In a fully
integrated global market, prices for internationally traded products
should converge across countries.56 As long as McDonald's is
successful in ensuring that the Big Mac is a uniform product in all of
its restaurants worldwide, the Big Mac index should accurately report
"McParity." Admittedly, the Big Mac index is vulnerable to
distortions attributable to taxes, locally variable profit margins, and
differences in the cost of nontradeable goods and services.57 The
accuracy of the Big Mac index also depends on rational pricing
decisions by McDonald's, which in early 2003 offered eight Chicken
McNuggets for $2 (in units of four for $1) but charged $2.29 for six.58
Nevertheless, the Big Mac index actually outperformed some
professional economists in predicting the exchange rate between the
euro and the U.S. dollar. One study, for instance, valued the unified
12, 2002, at B1; Clyde Haberman, As Inevitable as Pepperoni: Higher Fares, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2002, at B1; Sam Roberts, The Return of the Subway Token Dance, Jan. 22, 1995, § 1,
at 27.
53. See Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Farewell, Subway Token, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at B1.
54. Nick Paumgarten, Two Bucks, NEW YORKER, May 19,2003, at 34.
55. See generally Big MacCurrencies, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002; The Big Mac Index,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 22,2001.
56. See Kenneth Rogoff, The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE
647, 649-50 (1996).
57. Cf Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, How Wide Is the Border?, 86 AM. ECON. REV.
1112, 1120-21 (1996) (acknowledging that transaction costs (including transportation) and
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have kept international product markets from becoming
as fully integrated as their domestic counterparts).
58. See Gregg Easterbrook, The Weekend the Gods Winced (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://espn.go.com/page2/s/tmq/030121.html.
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European currency at $1.26 at the time of its debut in 1999.' 9 The
euro fell below $1.00 soon after its introduction. By the spring of
2003, the euro not only regained parity with the dollar, but also shot
past the $1.168 level at which it "began life in 1999... before slipping
into a long, politically embarrassing decline. '' 6" A revitalized euro has
recovered some political prestige for the European Union, but at a
price. A robust euro puts price pressure on European exports.6' The
European Union's monetary resurgence has benefited Asian nations
with large trade surpluses vis-d-vis the United States.62 Meanwhile,
monetary union exposes profound macroeconomic divisions within
Europe. A unified currency inflicts higher real interest rates on
countries with lower rates of inflation and slower rates of growth
relative to other participants in the monetary union.63 By cramping
exports, a rapid increase in the euro's value pushes certain countries
toward recession while energizing opposition to monetary union in
Britain and other members of the European Union that have not yet
adopted the euro.6 4
I1. Inflation as an Instrument of Policy
A. Taxation
The ability to address or ignore inflation facilitates a broad range
of legislative options. Tax policy in particular maximizes inflation's
potential footprint. During the Great Depres,, rn, John Maynard
Keynes noted that unchecked inflation is "the form of taxation which
the public find hardest to evade and even the weakest Government
can enforce. 6 1 Indeed, in the wake of the Russian Revolution,
Keynes had already acknowledged V.I. Lenin's brilliant insight that
"debauch[ing]" a nation's currency through unchecked inflation
59. See ENRIQUE ALBEROLA ET AL., GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATES,
DOLLAR "INS," "OUTS," AND OTHER MAJOR CURRENCIES IN A PANEL COINTEGRATION
FRAMEWORK (International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 2000). See generally
Franck Perrin, The Euro and Global Capital Markets: The Impact of the New Century,
CANAD. INVESTMENT REV. (Fall 2000).
60. Mark Landler, Euro Comes Alive as Shock Absorber for Tumbling Dollar, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C4.
61. See Mark Landler, A Strong Euro with Few Admirers, N.Y. TIMES, at Cl, C2.
62. See Keith Bradsher, Asian Nations Gain Indirectly from Dollar's Declining Value,
N.Y. TIMES, at C1.
63. See Re-engineering the Euro, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2002, at 72; JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI
& JtROME CREEL, HOW TO REFORM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (Centre for
European Reform, 2002), available at http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/343.html.
64. See Mark Landler, Euro Beginning to Flex Its Economic Muscles, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2003, § 1, at 6.
65. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 41 (1935).
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enables "governments [to] confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an
important part of the wealth of their citizens" and thereby to render
"the ultimate foundation[s] of capitalism.., so utterly disordered as
to be almost meaningless., 66  Keynes likewise predicted that the
Treaty of Versailles would spur hyperinflation in Germany,
67
recognized in retrospect as a proximate cause of the rise of Nazism
and of World War II.
Inflation interacts with "common policy distortions" to
exacerbate "the failure of the land sales market to distribute land
optimally."' "[I]nflation and the tax laws interact to raise the return
on land and lower the return on reproducible capital. 69 This effect
explains the otherwise surprising deviation from "elementary
economic theory.., that land and all other real assets would hold
their real value when the price level" rises."' "[A]n unanticipated
jump in the expected rate of inflation causes an immediate jump in
the level of the land price. After this initial jump, the price of land
increases at the same rate as the general rate of inflation."7 As a
result, land "is often a good hedge against inflation, especially in
countries where financial markets are not well developed."72  If
investors do not expect current or future interest rates to reflect
inflation fully, and if investors do not perceive land to be riskier than
alternative investments, their excess demand will drive up the price of
land as a speculative asset." The resulting distributive impact is as
regressive as any other tax policy: "inflation enhances the wealth of
those who already own land and provides.., bigger landowners a
capital base to purchase even additional acres.
74
66. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 235
(1920).
67. See id. at 235-48.
68. Hans P. Binswanger, Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Power, Distortions, Revolt
and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations, in 3 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 2659, 2710 (Jere Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995).
69. Martin Feldstein, Inflation, Portfolio Choice, and the Prices of Land and Corporate
Stock, 62 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 910,910 (1980).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Antonio Salazar P. Brandao & Gershon Feder, Regulatory Policies and Reform: The
Case of Land Markets, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 191,191 (Claudio Frischtak ed., 1995).
73. See Richard E. Just & John A. Miranowski, U.S. Land Prices: Trends and
Determinants, in AGRICULTURE AND GOVERNMENTS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
755 (Allen Maunder & Alberto Valdes eds., 1988).
74. GILBERT C. FITE, AMERICAN FARMERS: THE NEW MINORITY 239 (1981).
Currency devaluation has similar albeit unpredictable redistributive effects. See Daniel
Altman & Sherri Day, A Falling Dollar: Some Lose, Some Win, Some Break Even, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C1.
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In certain extraordinary circumstances, inflation as a form of
taxation can be "fairer" than formal taxation or even taxation
schemes purporting to use inflation as a benchmark for valuation. In
Nordlinger v. Hahn,75  the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of California's Proposition 13. Adopted at the
height of inflation during the late 1970s, Proposition 13 purported to
cap the valuation of taxable residential property according to
inflation, but stipulated that annual adjustments of property tax
assessments could not exceed two percent a year.76 At the same time,
Proposition 13 provided that property undergoing "new construction
or a change of ownership" would be taxed at "current appraised
value."7  "[S]taggering" disparities in tax treatment resulted. The
Supreme Court nevertheless upheld Proposition 13's two-tiered
valuation scheme as a rational way for a state "to discourage rapid
turnover in ownership of homes and businesses" and to protect the
"reliance interests" of incumbent property owners "against higher
taxes."79
But let us set aside extraordinary circumstances. The ordinary
effect of inflation is remarkable enough in its own right. Like
taxation, inflation "directly alters economic decisions and...
incomes."" By "discourag[ing] households and businesses from
holding assets in the form of cash or demand deposits and
encourag[ing] them [instead] to hold other assets or to increase
consumption," both inflation and more direct forms of taxation "alter
real interest rates," which "further affects savings and investment."'"
Inflation affects taxation in two ways. Inflation not only
confounds the calculation of capital gains, business income, and
interest for tax purposes, but also blurs bracket boundaries, personal
exemption amounts, and the like."' The latter problem, which affects
tax structure, arises "from the mundane fact that inflation reduces the
real value of any dollar magnitude contained in private contracts or
public laws."83 Although the structural problem does compound over
75. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
76. See id. at 5.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Henry J. Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in INFLATION AND
THE INCOME TAX 1, 2 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1976).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 5; Edward F. Denison, Price Series for Indexing the Income Tax System, in
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 80, at 233, 234; Emil M. Sunley, Jr. & Joseph
A. Pechman, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 80, at 153.
83. Aaron, supra note 80, at 3.
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time,m the relatively simple expedient of applying an inflation index
to "the most important reference points" in the Internal Revenue
Code, such as "personal exemptions,.., the standard deduction, the
earned-income credit, and the rate brackets[,] ... would eliminate
almost all distortions caused by fixed dollar amounts.,
85
Inflationary interference with the computation of the tax base
presents a somewhat stickier problem. Inflationary corrosion of the
tax base means that profits, rents, and interest payments gauged
according to nominal dollar yardsticks in fact fail to "measure income
in prices of any date." 6 For this reason, inflation-influenced figures
purporting to report business incomes "are numbers that defy
definition except by reference to the method of their calculation."87
Specific illustrations of inflation's impact on taxation abound. In
his first year as President, Ronald Reagan sought to unshackle the
federal income tax from inflation. By indexing tax brackets according
to consumer prices, 8 the 1981 tax reform act attempted to curb
inflation as a driver of growth in the federal fisc. 9 From 1960 to 1975,
only periodic tax cuts and other legislative adjustments kept the
effective tax rate from rising beyond 50 percent. ' Other aspects of
tax policy follow the opposite approach from that of the 1981 reform.
Most notoriously, the alternative minimum tax takes no account of
inflation.9' Originally designed to prevent the wealthiest taxpayers
from exploiting the myriad tax preferences embedded within the
Internal Revenue Code,92 the alternative minimum tax embraces an
ever greater number of middle-class taxpayers as incomes surge past
84. See Denison, supra note 82, at 233 ("the greater the price rise has been since the tax
structure was established, the higher the ratio of government revenue from income taxes to
national income or product will be").
85. Sunley & Pechman, supra note 82, at 154 (describing this solution as equivalent to
deflating tax schedules and the amount of adjusted gross income and taxable income
reported on each tax return). See generally George Vukelich, The Effect of Inflation on Real
Tax Rates, 20 CANAD. TAX J. 327 (1972).
86. Denison, supra note 82, at 234.
87. Id.
88. See I.R.C. § 1(f) (2000).
89. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-215, at 200 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 285,
290; cf ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 150-56 (1987) (describing the "ratchet effect" by which
Congress increases not only the scale but also the scope of the federal government on a
permanent basis).
90. Sunley & Pechman, supra note 82, at 158-59; see also George M. von Furstenberg,
Individual Income Taxation and Inflation, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 117 (1975).
91. See I.R.C. § 55 (2000).
92. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1445, pt. 3, at 203 (1978); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1800, at
263-68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7198, 7259-65; Beverly Moran, Stargazing:




fixed statutory thresholds. Though some analysts downplay indexing
as a tool for "promot[ing] ... equality in the distribution of after-tax
incomes," arguing that "[t]he effect of a nonindexed rate structure on
the distribution of income is basically neutral,"' 3 the example of the
alternative minimum tax suggests otherwise. "The effect of inflation
on the progressivity of the income tax system is important and
noteworthy but usually overlooked."9 4
B. Constitutional Law
Inflation and the law's response to it affect numerous
constitutional issues. True to the typically deferential posture that it
has adopted since the New Deal on matters of economic policy," the
Supreme Court has given Congress wide berth in fashioning
legislative responses to inflation. By upholding the power of
Congress to abrogate the United States' contractual obligations to
pay contracts in gold, and thereby to declare all such contracts
payable in any currency or coin designated as legal tender, the Gold
Clause Cases gave Congress an impressive degree of freedom over
this aspect of monetary policy. 6 Although a promise to pay public
debts in gold serves as a hedge against depreciation of currency, that
promise would also "increase the demand for gold,... encourage
hoarding, and.., stimulate attempts at exportation of gold coin." 7 In
the years leading to the Great Depression, gold clauses became
unsustainable in an international community whose members freely
used competitive currency devaluations and retaliatory tariffs in trade
disputes.' Thanks to the Gold Clause Cases, Congress may freely
adopt or (as has been true since the Depression) eschew the gold
standard as a means of controlling inflation.
Campaign finance regulation provides another glimpse at
Congress's ability to manipulate the law's treatment of inflation.
93. Edward M. Gramlich, The Economic and Budgetary Effects of Indexing the Tax
System, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 80, at 271,279.
94. Martin J. Bailey, Inflationary Distortions and Taxes, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME
TAX, supra note 80, at 291, 296; see also Sunley & Pechman, supra note 82, at 157 ("Inflation
has the greatest relative effect on tax liabilities at the lowest end of the income scale.").
95. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby 312 U.S.
100 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 153 n.4 (1938); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
96. See Norman v, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 311-16 (1935); see also
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); cf
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329 (1937) (upholding, on the authority of the Gold Clause
Cases, the power of Congress to terminate the accrual of interest on World War I-vintage
"Liberty Loan" bonds).
97. Norman, 294 U.S. at 313.
98. See generally ROSENN, supra note 16, at 45-51.
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Friends and foes of campaign finance regulation evidently agree that
growth in campaign spending has outpaced inflation in the economy
at large." Political campaigning thus became perhaps the only form
of expression whose orice rose in spite of the late twentieth century's
revolution in communications technology. "" As the Supreme Court
noted in Buckley v. Valeo,'°' the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 and its 1974 amendments adjusted their ceilings on candidate
and party expenditures according to annual changes in inflation."2
Other provisions of federal campaign finance law have ignored
inflation. For example, Congress failed to index the tax return
checkoff for contributions to the public funding of presidential
campaigns.' 3 For two decades, no taxpayer could direct the federal
government to contribute more than $1 to the federal fund providing
public campaign financing to presidential candidates who accepted
voluntary expenditure limits. The checkoff's failure to keep pace
with inflation severely constrained the growth of the presidential
campaign fund, even as the indexing of those spending limits entitled
candidates to an ever greater flow of federal subsidies. This
confluence of contradictory policies threatened the solvency of the
presidential campaign fund." Congress eventually responded in 1993
by tripling the checkoff amount from $1 to $3.'°' But the failure of the
99. See, e.g., Marty Jezer, Randy Kehler & Ben Senturia, A Proposal for Democratically
Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 336 (1993); Jamin Raskin
& John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273,
326 (1993) (documenting a 700% increase in campaign spending between 1982 and 1992);
Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens' Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 12-13 (1997).
100. Cf., e.g., SHARON BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND THE INTERNET AGE
56 (2002) (observing that per minute rates for a long-distance telephone call dropped from
$3 to ten cents thanks to deregulation of the telecommunications industry during the late
twentieth century); BERNARDO A. HUBERMAN, THE LAWS OF THE WEB: PATTERNS IN
THE ECOLOGY OF INFORMATION 11 (2001) ("Whereas a three-minute telephone call from
New York to London in 1934 cost $300 in 1996 dollars, today it costs less than a dollar. If
this trend continues, it will essentially be free to communicate by voice from one end of the
planet to the other."). See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104
YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
101. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
102. See id. at 55 & n.62; 18 U.S.C. § 608(d) (1976), reprinted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 192-
93, recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) (2000).
103. See I.R.C. § 6096(a) (2000).
104. See Joseph Michael Pace, Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns and Elections:
Is There a Viable Future?, 24 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 146-47 (1994); Fred Wertheimer
& Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our
Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1142 & n.89 (1994) (observing that inflation indexing
under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) increased voluntary spending limits on presidential candidates "by
more than 250%" from 1974 to 1992).
105. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13441(a), 107
Stat. 312, 567 (1993) (amending I.R.C. § 6096(a)).
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1993 amendment to match the inflation indexing of expenditure limits
practically guarantees that Congress must revisit the issue when the
presidential campaign fund once again courts financial ruin.'
6
Even more conspicuously, federal campaign finance laws also
failed for roughly three decades to apply any inflation index to the
original $1,000 limit on campaign contributions.'"7 This failure (or
refusal) to accommodate inflation posed a much graver threat to the
viability of federal campaign finance regulation. As inflation
continued apace, the unadjusted $1,000 limit became a progressively
tighter constraint on political speech by proxy. Opponents of
campaign finance regulation argued that the $1,000 limit created a
"new constitutional problem[]" insofar as federal campaign finance
law had come to "permit[] only contributions of a negligible value in
terms of 1976 dollars" and thereby to prevent candidates from
"amass[ing] sufficient resources to mount effective campaigns."""
Throughout the 1990s, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit repeatedly questioned the validity of state-law
limits on campaign contributions that similarly failed to account for
inflation. ' In 2000 that court's chief judge went so far as to suggest
that inflation had made it impossible to compare state-law
contribution "limits of $1,075, $525, and $275" in 1998 dollars with the
$1,000 federal cap at issue in Buckley.' In delivering the final word
on the Shrink Missouri litigation, the Supreme Court took pains to
decouple constitutional analysis from macroeconomics. The Justices
declined the Eighth Circuit's invitation to calibrate free speech rights
according to "the power of the dollar" instead of a candidate's
''power to mount a campaign with all the dollars likely to be
forthcoming...... What the Court has refused to disturb, however,
Congress has chosen to revamp. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
106. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 104, at 1142 n.89 (arguing that "the checkoff
[should] be indexed to prevent a [similar] shortfall in the future").
107. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) (2000) (applying inflation-based indexing solely to expenditure
limits in presidential campaigns, see id. § 441a(b), and expenditures by national, state, or
local party committees in connection with candidates' general election campaign for federal
office, see id. § 441a(d)).
108. Craig M. Engle, John DiLorenzo, Jr. & Charles Spies, Buckley over Time: A New
Problem with Old Contribution Limits, 24 J. LEGIS. 207, 209 (1998); see also id. at 213-14
("A $1000 Contribution Today Does Not Have an Appearance of Corruption Because of
Inflation and the Increased Cost of Running a Campaign since 1976.").
109. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127
(1995); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996);
Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 570-71 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998) and
525 U.S. 1145 (1999).
110. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1998) (opinion of
Bowman, C.J.), rev'd sub nom., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
111. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 397.
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Act of 2002112 has not only doubled the 1974-vintage hard money
contribution cap to $2,000,113 but also subjected the new cap to
inflation-based indexing."'
Campaign finance is by no means the only context in which
constitutional rights hinge on the legal treatment of dollar amounts.
In 1978 the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to
Congress's imposition of a $560 million ceiling on liability for an
accident at a federally licensed nuclear power plant,'
notwithstanding Guido Calabresi's suggestion that this limit,
originally set in 1957 and subsequently unamended, might have
become by 1978 "an unrealistic and detrimentally low estimate of
potential damages."' 16 Recent Supreme Court case law may have
breathed some new life into this contention. In the 1996 case of
BMW v. Gore,"7 the Court demanded that "economic penalties"
exacted under state law, either by legislation or by judicial decree,
"be supported by the State's interest in protecting its own consumers
and its own economy.""..8  Admittedly, Gore involved a punitive
damages award so excessive as to transgress due process, whereas any
constitutional defect in the Price-Anderson Act would stem from its
inappropriate suppression of damages that a jury could award. But
Gore appears to subject any legal involvement in the computation of
damages to scrutiny under the due process clause, without regard to
whether the law drives damages upward or downward."9 Although
the Price-Anderson Act was designed to restrict runaway jury awards,
its cap on damages, if characterized as utterly unrealistic in light of
inflationary trends over time, may join outrageous punitive damage
awards and retroactively imposed liability as "rare instances" of those
"most egregious of circumstances" that warrant the application of due
process analysis to the law of remedies. 2'
Inflation casts an even longer shadow across the constitutional
law of criminal procedure. The sixth amendment right to a jury trial 2'
112. Pub. L. No. 107-155,116 Stat. 81 (2002).
113. See id. § 307(a), 116 Stat. at 102 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)).
114. See id. § 307(d), 116 Stat. at 103 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c)).
115. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 86-87 (1978).
116. CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 233 n.22. The current version of the Price-Anderson
Act retains the $560 million cap originally set in 1957, see 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c), (e)(1)(C)
(2000), but provides that an independent cap on premiums charged to nuclear power
licensees should be adjusted for inflation, see id. § 2201(b)(1), (t).
117. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
118. Id. at 572.
119. See id.
120. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ).
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inheres only when the accused has been charged with a "serious"
rather than "petty" offense. Ever since its initial recognition that a
potential prison term of two years indicates the "serious" nature of
the underlying offense, '22 the Supreme Court has set the presumptive
temporal boundary between "serious" and "petty" offenses at six
months in prison.'2 In 1993 the Court refused to equate a maximum
fine of $5,000 with the "'sever[e] ... loss of liberty that a prison term
entails.""24  Three years later, Judge Richard Posner took inflation
into account in concluding that a nonviolent violation of the Freedom
of Access to Clinics Entrances Act, punishable by a six-month prison
sentence and a $10,000 fine,'25 does not qualify as a serious offense.'26
Under Judge Posner's approach, congressional failure to update fines
could transform serious offenses into petty ones over time.'27
Macroeconomic inertia, coupled with legislative inaction, could
dissolve the right of the accused to trial by jury.
Even the Justices themselves cannot elude inflation's grasp.
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal judges "shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." 2"  No less
than Article III's parallel promise that these judges "shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour,""'2  the Compensation Clause
safeguards the "complete independence of the courts of justice."'3
122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
123. Compare Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,69 & n.6 (1970) (presumptively defining
as "serious" any offense carrying a potential prison term exceeding six months) with Blanton
v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (presuming offenses punishable by
fewer than six months to be "petty" and therefore not covered by the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee).
124. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2) (2000).
126. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (7th Cir. 1996); see also State v.
Ford, 929 P.2d 78, 86 (Haw. 1996) (endorsing Soderna's refusal to treat a maximum fine of
$10,000 as conclusive evidence of a "serious" offense).
127. For a mathematically literate analysis of Judge Posner's opinion in Soderna, see
Andrew James McFarland, Note, Lewis v. United States: A Requiem for Aggregation, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 1057,1102-08 (1997).
128. U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 1.
129. Id.
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton);
see also id. at 472 ("Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable
Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1187-88 (2002); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D.
Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 976, 1208 (2002). See generally United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-
20 (1980); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1920); Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court,
October Term 2001-Foreword: A Judge on Judging. The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 54-55 (2002); Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence
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Later observers have also credited the clause with improving the
administration of justice by enabling the government to attract
talented lawyers, who must often accept less pay in order to enter
public service, to the federal bench.'3' The founders of the
Constitution, who were quite familiar with inflation as an economic
phenomenon, '3 intended the compensation clause to protect judges
against the erosive effects of "fluctuations in the value of money. '
Protection under the compensation clause, however, "'vests"' in "a
salary increase... only when it takes effect as , art of the
compensation due and payable to Article III judges." Moreover,
because judges are not "immun[e] from sharing with their fellow
citizens the material burden of the government," ''  Congress may
"enact a law imposing a nondiscriminatory tax (including an increase
in rates or a change in conditions) upon judges."'36  On the other
hand, the Compensation Clause does ban a "discriminatory" law that
"singl[es] out judges for disadvantageous treatment" and thereby
threatens "to diminish, or to equalize away, those very
characteristics" that Article III guarantees the independent federal
judiciary.137
In United States v. Halter, '3 the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not dodge Compensation Clause scrutiny merely by
arguing that a statutory salary increase has offset the amount of any
tax that might have unfairly targeted judges.'39 In so doing, the Court
in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989 (1996); Keith S. Rosenn, The Constitutional
Guaranty Against Diminution of Judicial Compensation, 24 UCLA L. REV. 308 (1976).
131. See Will, 449 U.S. at 221; Evans, 253 U.S. at 253.
132. See generally Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial
New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303 (2001).
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 473 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Alexandei Hamilton)
(declining to state "a fixed rate of compensation" in the Constitution precisely because of
variations in the value of money over time, but emphasizing the need to remove "the power
of [Congress] to change the [economic] condition of the individual [judge] for the worse");
see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (reporting James Madison's proposal to guard against "variations in the value of
money" by fixing judicial salaries according to the price of "wheat or some other thing of
permanent value").
134. Will, 449 U.S. at 229.
135. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939).
136. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 571 (2001).
137. Id. at 576. Life tenure and salary protection have historically distinguished federal
judges from their counterparts in the states. See, e.g., GERHARD CASPER, The Judiciary Act
of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING
PERIOD 132, 137-38 (1997); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1127 (1977). See generally Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 273
(2002).
138. 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
139. See id. at 578-79.
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observed that a 1984 salary increase for federal judges appeared
primarily to be motivated by Congress's desire "to restore.., to
judges ... some, but not all, of the real compensation that inflation
had eroded" during the previous two decades.4 The Court cited a
study contrasting salaries for district judges between 1969 and 1999
with consumer prices and private-sector salaries over the same
period.' Judicial salaries evidently rose 253 percent, far behind the
363 percent increase in consumer prices and the 421 percent increase
in private-sector salaries.4 2 The failure of judicial pay to keep pace
with real prices and with private-sector salaries has taken an apparent
toll: 52 federal judges retired or resigned between 1991 and 2000,
many evidently in order to return to the private practice of law.'43
One Term after Hatter, the Court in March 2002 refused to
review a case raising another Compensation Clause claim based on
Congress's decision to override previously scheduled cost-of-living
increases in judicial pay.'44 Justice Breyer protested the denial of
certiorari to no avail; only three Justices in all-one short of the
number needed to secure the writ' 45-heeded the warning that
allowing the lower court decision to stand "would render ineffectual
any congressional effort to protect judges' real compensation, even
from the most malignant hyperinflation.'
4
6
140. Id. at 579.
141. See id.
142. See id. (citing A.B.A., FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION 11 (2001)). See generally
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2003), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf; Frank M. Coffin & Robert A.
Katzmann, Steps Towards Optimal Judicial Workways: Perspectives from the Federal Bench,
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377 (2003).
143. See Kent S. Hofmeister, Of Chapters and an Independent Federal Judiciary, FED.
LAW., Jan. 2003, at 3. But cf RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 30 (1996) (arguing that power and prestige will continue to draw qualified
lawyers to the federal bench despite disparities between judicial and private-sector salaries);
THE REMARKABLE HANDS: AN AFFECTIONATE PORTRAIT 47-48 (Maria Nelson ed.,
1983) (quoting Judge Augustus Hand's reaction to "judges complaining about their pay": "I
say to Hell with them. Let them retire to opulence or obscurity, as the case may be."),
quoted in Jack B. Weinstein, In Memoriam-Eugene H. Nickerson, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1200 (2002).
144. See Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002) (denying certiorari to 240 F.3d
1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also Williams v. United States, 264 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(reporting three circuit judges' dissent from the Federal Circuit's denial of rehearing en
banc).
145. See generally H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1992).
146. Williams, 535 U.S. at 915 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). For an account
of a public encounter between Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist over the issue of
judicial pay, see Linda Greenhouse, Pay Erodes, Judges Flee, and Relief Is Not at Hand, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A14.
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C. Conventional Rate-of-Return Regulation
"It is hard to overstate the impact of inflation on [traditional,
cost-of-service] utility ratemaking." r47 Inflation takes an especially
heavy toll on regulated utilities, whose reliance on capital-intensive
"fixed facilities" weakens their ability to resist "increase[s] in
construction costs substantially in excess of the increase in price levels
for goods in general.'1 8  The typically long lives of utility assets
aggravates these firms' vulnerability to inflation."'9 Whereas firms in
"unregulated capital intensive industries" may "increase prices so
that" their "productive capacity.., is not diminished," regulated
firms must rely on their regulators' ability to mimic the pricing
mechanism of a hypothetical competitive market whose existence is
precluded by the very presence of laws regulating entry, exit, and
rates.5 Like bondholders, whose fixed rates of return can easily fall
behind rapidly rising prices, utility investors feel queasy during times
of inflation.
Compounding the misery is a historical accident. The law of
public utilities traces its constitutional origins to a period in American
history when inflation was largely unknown.'' As the Supreme Court
completed its jurisprudential arc from the "public interest"
philosophy of the 1870s52 to the "confiscatory ratemaking" and "fair
value" ideology of the economic due process era,'53 the inflation
147. Robert A. Webb, Utility Rate Base Valuation in an Inflationary Economy, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 823, 828 (1976).
148. Id. at 829-30.
149. See id. at 830.
150. See id. at 858 ("If the equity investor sees inflation steadily eroding the real earning
potential of his investment,.., he must regard the utility as having a substantial degree of
risk not present in similar enterprises having freedom to change their prices to reflect
changing price levels."). On the practical impossibility of the traditional public utility
regulator's task, see generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21
STAN. L. REV. 548, 611-16 (1969).
151. Cf Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 917 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (describing "monetary inflation" as "a phenomenon familiar to the nation's
founders, but absent during much of the Nineteenth Century").
152. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co.
v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877).
153. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U.S. 362 (1894); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890). See generally, e.g., Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1535 (1999); John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional
Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65 (1985); Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost
of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 605 (1996); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the
Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
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occasioned by the Civil War faded into memory. Indeed, in his classic
1923 dissent extolling the virtues of the "prudent investment," or
"original cost," approach to ratemaking, Justice Brandeis mistakenly
predicted that "the peak price levels" experienced during what he
called "the World War" would undergo a "continuous decline[]," as
they had after the War of 1812 and the Civil War.54 According to
some regulatory scholars, Justice Brandeis's preference for the
original cost valuation method and its subsequent endorsement by the
Court at large in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.5' rested on shaky assumptions regarding inflation.1
6
Inflation confounds rate regulation all the way down. Rising
prices can frustrate elaborate attempts to exploit public utilities as
"tax collectors par excellence."'5 7 The use of accelerated depreciation
in utility ratemaking'51 in theory "results in higher deductions and
lower taxes ... in early years, and.., lower deductions and higher
taxes in later years."'59  In practice, however, the presence of
"constantly expanding investments... and continuous inflation in the
economy" enables a utility "to avoid the 'turnaround' point when
taxes are supposed to become higher than under the usual straight-
line method" and thereby to realize "large and permanent tax
savings."""
Efforts to account for the effects of inflation in ratemaking can
backfire. In particular, efforts to set rates for oil pipelines have
suffered from federal regulatory agencies' propensity to account for
inflation not once but twice, in the valuation of the rate base and
again in the determination of the rate of return. 16 Such double
counting overcompensates the regulated firm at ratepayers' expense.
The proper solution lies in ensuring that any "increase in the rate
base-which is affected and indeed justified by the fact that present
154. Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 295 n.6, 303-
04 n. 16 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
155. 320 U.S. 591 (1944); see id. at 602 ("It is not theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts. If the total effect of [a] rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an end.").
156. See A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 504-05 (1969);
Webb, supra note 147, at 832-33 & n.37.
157. ELI W. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 526 (1950).
158. See I.R.C. § 167 (2000); FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458,466-
67(1973).
159. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FERC, 707 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
160. Id. at 567-68; see also Pub. Sys. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir.1979); Ala.-
Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1966).
161. See Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1523-24 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 584 F.2d 408,419-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Williams
Bros. Pipe Line Co., 355 I.C.C. 479, 487 (1976). See generally Steven Reed & Pantelis
Michalopoulos, Oil Pipeline Regulatory Reform: Still in the Labyrinth?, 16 ENERGY L.J. 65
(1995).
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values reflect inflationary effects-is not counted in calculating rates
because expected inflation is already reflected in the level of rates of
return."'62
In part V.B. of this article, I shall discuss an active controversy in
contemporary regulatory policy that hinges on measures of general
inflation and of price increases affecting a particular industry. Price-
level regulation, which has been widely deployed in place of
conventional rate-of-return regulation, relies heavily on measures of
inflation. As a result, it provides a singularly useful illustration of the
decisions that legal actors must make when grappling with inflation.
D. Agricultural Regulation: The Rise and Fall of "Parity" Pricing
One final interlude is in order. No discussion of the role of prices
and purchasing power in regulatory policy would be complete without
at least a mention of the "parity" concept in agricultural regulation.
"Parity" prices for agricultural commodities are a relic of Depression-
era agricultural legislation. The "parity index" refers to the ratio of
current prices, wages, interest rates, and taxes paid by farmers relative
to "the general level of such prices, wages, rates, and taxes during the
period January 1910 to December 1914, inclusive., 161 Why these four
years should be enshrincd in American agrarian legend depends less
on logic than on Oliver Wendell Holmes's proverbial "page ofhistory. ' ' 164
Simply put, the Great War ended American agriculture's golden
age. The war that made the world safe for democracy made this land
perilous for agriculture.'6 5  "The initial shock of war in
1914... brought an overnight collapse in the foreign sales of wheat
and cotton .... ."'6 When America entered the war three years later,
the 40 million acres rushed into production depressed grain prices
even further as the Plains states pumped out huge harvests.' 67 Nor did
military victory restore foreign markets. Transformed by military
162. Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1525. In the proceeding at issue, however, FERC failed
to handle inflation properly because its ratemaking methodology "permit[ted] the regulated
companies to select the rate of return index" that offered them the most favorable regulatory
treatment. Id.
163. 7 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1)(C) (2000); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 54
(1936) (reporting the use of a "base period" of August 1909 through July 1914 in the
determination of price and income support levels under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933).
164. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); see also OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1902) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.").
165. See generally BENJAMIN H. HIBBARD, EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WAR UPON
AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 22-67 (1919).
166. THEODORE SALOUTOS, THE AMERICAN FARMER AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (1982).
167. See id.
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victory from a global debtor into a creditor, the United States became
a nation of importers. The rosy balance of payments made it
extremely difficult to restore American agricultural exports to
antebellum levels, much less to conquer new overseas markets.'
16
Political instability razed several significant European markets.
Crushed by brutal reparation obligations, Germany hiked tariffs and
subsidized domestic grain production. 69 Fascist Italy likewise closed
its markets in favor of domestic growers. 70  The restructuring of
Soviet agriculture all but barred imports."'
Back home, wartime inflation devastated the purchasing power
of farmers.' Even the substitution of diesel- and gas-driven
mechanical power for horsepower pinched farmers: the systematic
replacement of horses with machinery simultaneously raised yields,
increased dependence on purchased inputs, and decreased demand
for feed grains.' Most spectacularly, the mechanical cotton picker
rendered "obsolete the sharecropper system" that was the last
economic vestige of the South's antebellum plantation culture.'74
Aggravated by the boll weevil scourge of the 1920s,"5 mechanization
would eventually spur the nominally voluntary but economically
compelled migration of six and a half million black Americans in
"one of the largest and most rapid mass internal movements of
people in history.', 7 6 The farm crisis of the period between the World
168. See, e.g., Edwin C. Nourse, The Trend of Agricultural Exports, 36 J. POL. ECON. 330
(1928); Rexford G. Tugwell, The Problem of Agriculture, 39 POL. SCI. Q. 549 (1924).
169. See Leo Pasvolsky, International Relations and Financial Conditions in Foreign
Countries Affecting the Demand for American Agricultural Products, 14 J. FARM. ECON. 257,
260-62 (1932).
170. See id. at 262-63; N.W. Hazan, The Agricultural Program of Fascist Italy, 15 J. FARM
ECON. 489 (1933).
171. See Mordecai Ezekiel, European Competition in Agricultural Production with Special
Reference to Russia, 14 J. FARM ECON. 267, 271-73 (1932). But cf U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1942 FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES 5,346
(1942) (reporting that the Soviet Union had resumed its role as a leading importer of
American wheat and flour by the 1940s).
172. See A.B. Genung, The Purchasing Power of the Farmer's Dollar from 1913 to Date,
117 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 22 (1925).
173. See SALOUTOS, supra note 166, at 6,25.
174. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 5 (1991).
175. See 4 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1930, at 12 (1932) ("The boll weevil was probably responsible for
more changes in the number of farms, farm acreage, and farm population [during the 1920s]
than all other causes put together."); Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its
Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1303 (1995); Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism
Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 397-98 (1997).
176. LEMANN, supra note 174, at 6; see also CONRAD TAEUBER & IRENE B. TAEUBER,
THE CHANGING POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 109-11 (1958) (discussing the
internal migration "of Negroes from the South to the other parts of the country" as a
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Wars thus illustrated how "the process of economic development and
specialization" transforms "functions which are necessary to the total
economic process of" agriculture into "separate and independent
productive functions operated in conjunction with the agricultural
function but no longer a part of it."'77
In terms known to students of antitrust and economic regulation,
many American farmers were caught in a classic price squeeze."'
Depressed demand and prices for farm products coincided with
unbearable increases in the cost of living and production. The
churning of real farm incomes upon an "agricultural treadmill"'7 9
transformed parity into the agricultural sector's principal political
imperative. After its initial articulation during the 1920s,' 0 the notion
that the government should preserve "the ratio of the prices farmers
receive for the products they sell to the prices they pay for goods and
services" at a level enjoyed during American agriculture's golden age
on the eve of World War I became a rallying point during the
Depression for those "advocating increased income for farmers.''.
Historic efforts to ensure parity between prices received by
farmers for agricultural commodities and prices paid by farmers for
business supplies and consumer goods demonstrate one of the most
important motivations for the law to keep proper track of prices:
maintaining the welfare of a favored group vis-d-vis that of society at
large. Because perfect competition--or at least the closest thing to
perfect competition in real-world markets-prevents any farmer from
being able to affect commodity prices merely by manipulating
output, 2 individual farmers as "price takers" have no defense against
market-driven changes in commodity prices. The historic root of
agrarian anger is the producer's complaint that crucial members of
the urban economy, especially handlers of farm commodities and
phenomenon that had "increased with dramatic speed" as "Negroes [moved] out of the
southern States" and into "very largely.., urban areas").
177. Farmers Reservoir & Irrig. Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 761 (1949).
178. See generally, e.g., FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976); City of Anaheim
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1992); John E. Lopatka, The
Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563 (1984).
179. See generally WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 85-
107 (1958) (explaining this farm-flavored variant of the price squeeze); WILLARD C.
COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 378-95 (1979) (same).
180. See generally GEORGE PEEK & HUGH JOHNSON, EQUALITY FOR AGRICULTURE
(1922); William R. Camp, The Organization of Agriculture in Relation to the Problem of
Price Stabilization, 32 J. POL. ECON. 282 (1924).
181. Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68
MINN. L. REV. 333, 336 (1983).
182. See, e.g., Nat'l Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 825-26 (1978); id.
at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 841, 846, 849 (White, J., dissenting); Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940).
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other agribusinesses, reap too large a share of the retail food dollar,
all at the farmer's expense. 3 To put it bluntly, "farmers [buy] at
retail and [sell] at wholesale."'" Parity, if achieved, would level the
playing field by ensuring that the prices received by farmers for their
products would keep pace with the prices for "the commodities they
had to purchase in the nonfarm sector.""'8
Sweeping social change during the early twentieth century
compounded agrarian anxiety over the farm sector's acute and
accurate sense of falling behind urban America. The 1920 Census
was the first to report a higher urban than rural population; in the
following decade, the urban population of the United States would
grow by an unprecedented 15 million.'l Yet parity would not prevail
during the Roaring '20s; Congress never passed the McNary-Haugen
plan to establish parity through tariffs, taxes on farm commodities,
and price supports through government purchases of farm products.' 7
Parity's rhetorical power held sway throughout it all. Despite
"varying personal philosophies, particular regional loyalties, and
different commodity interests, the great majority of agricultural
spokesmen came to embrace parity so firmly that the "concept
approached the acceptance and authority of Scripture in farm
thinking." 8"
The drive for agricultural reform finally bore fruit during the
New Deal. "9 When the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 became
183. See CEDRIC B. COWING, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS AND PROGRESSIVES: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF STOCK AND COMMODITY SPECULATION, 1890-1936, at 267 (1965); Roberta
Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
279, 333-34 (1997).
184. FITE, supra note 74, at 32.
185. Id. at 31.
186. The decade between 1920 and 1930 witnessed an unprecedented increase of
14,796,850 in the United States' urban population. See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950, at 12 (1953) (reporting an
increase of 14,796,850 in the urban population of the United States between 1920 and 1930).
The first decennial census after World War II surveyed the demographic trends from a larger
historic perspective:
In 1790, 1 out of every 20 of the 3,929,214 inhabitants of the United States was
living in urban territory. In every decade thereafter, with the exception of that
from 1810 to 1820, the rate of growth of the urban population exceeded that of
the rural population. By 1860, one out of five persons was included in the urban
population. The process of urbanization continued in the follov ing decades, and
by 1920 the urban population exceeded the rural population.
Id.
187. See GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 501-02 (7th ed. 1994). See generally FITE, supra note 74, at 42-47 (describing the
McNary-Haugen plan from its inception to two vetoes by President Coolidge and its
eventual death upon the election of President Hoover).
188. FITE, supra note 74, at 65.
189. See generally SALOUTOS, supra note 166.
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law on May 12, 1933," President Roosevelt touted the Act as "the
most drastic and far-reaching piece of farm legislation ever proposed
in time of peace."19' An unsympathetic Supreme Court viewed the
1933 Act as a transparent and unconstitutional use of Congress's
taxing power to achieve parity between agricultural producers and
agribusiness processors:
Beyond cavil the sole object of the legislation is to restore the
purchasing power of agricultural products to a parity with that
prevailing in an earlier day; to take money from the processor and
bestow it upon farmers who will reduce their acreage.., and,
meanwhile, to aid these farmers during the period required to bring
the prices of their crops to the desired level.'92
In response to that debacle, the ambitious Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 19389' put the word "parity" into federal
legislation for the first time.'94 When the 1938 Act survived Supreme
Court review, agrarian activists realized their dream of enforcing
rural-urban parity through federal law.
Legislative success, however, did nothing to cure the deep
economic flaws in the parity concept. 96 Because a legislative
guarantee of a historic level of purchasing power for farmers wreaked
ruin on the federal budget, Congress began abandoning the parity
190. Act of May 12, 1933, c. 25,48 Stat. 31 [codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624].
191. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, New Means to Rescue Agriculture-The Agricultural
Adjustment Act, in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
74, 79 (1938).
192. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1936) (footnote omitted); cf Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (invalidating Congress's use of its taxing power to pass the
Future Trading Act of 1921).
193. Act of February 16, 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1281-1393 (2000)).
194. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 declared a congressional policy of
establishing "prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing
power with respect to articles that farmers buy" commensurate with the purchasing power
enjoyed by farmers during the 1909-14 period. See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
FARMERS 115-16 (1982).
195. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (upholding the 1938 Act as an appropriate
exercise of Congress's commerce power); cf Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 (1923)
(upholding the Grain Futures Act of 1922 as a proper exercise of Congress's commerce
power).
196. See generally American Farm Economics Association, Committee on Parity
Concepts, Outline of a Price Policy for American Agriculture for the Postwar Period, 28 J.
FARM ECON. 380 (1946); American Farm Economics Association, Committee on Parity
Concepts, On the Redefinition of Parity Price and Parity Income, 29 J. FARM ECON. 1358
(1947); W.H. Nicholls & D.G. Johnson, The Farm Price Policy Awards, 1945: A Topical
Digest of the Winning Essays, 28 J. FARM ECON. 267 (1946); K.T. Wright, Basic Weaknesses
of the Parity Price Formula for a Period of Extensive Adjustments in Agriculture, 28 J. FARM
ECON. 294 (1946).
July 2003]
concept with the 1973 farm bill. 97  Little if any contemporary
agricultural policy of any consequence turns on parity.9 Though
effectively dead as a legally significant producer price index, parity
"has persisted as a slogan for At an extreme, the holy
grail of equalizing purchasing power as between rural Americans and
their urban counterparts has spurred agrarian advocates into
comparing the economically fueled depopulation of "[n]umerous
rural regions within the United States" with the "coloniz[ation]" of
"Third World countries."2°° There is little to be said for such logic
except to call it "galling."' ' Nevertheless, the boldness with which
agrarian advocates in the United States deploy the principle of
purchasing power parity on behalf of a strictly domestic dispute over
income inequality does vividly illustrate the enduring appeal of the
parity concept.
In short, inflation has emerged as a serious issue across several
legal contexts. Nevertheless, few legal scholars besides Keith Rosenn
have devoted relatively little attention to its proper measurement.
The balance of this article constitutes my effort toward ameliorating
this shortcoming.
IV. Taking (and Measuring) Inflation Seriously
A. Choosing an Inflation Index
My discussion so far should establish this much: whether
Congress chooses to address inflation at all can materially affect the
law. Once Congress has decided to tackle the problem, how it tracks
inflation is also significant. Of course, no perfect gauge of inflation
exists. "There are billions of prices in modern economies, and there
is no feasible method to monitor their constant movements.,
20 2
197. See Claude T. Coffman, Target Prices, Deficiency Payments, and the Agriculture and
Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 50 N.D. L. REV. 299, 305-07 (1974); Wayne D.
Rasmussen, New Deal Agricultural Policies After Fifty Years, 68 MINN. L. REV. 353, 361-63
(1983).
198. See Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1083 (2002); LLOYD D. TEIGEN, AGRICULTURAL PARITY: HISTORICAL REVIEW AND
ALTERNATIVE CALCULATIONS (USDA, Econ. Research Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 571,
1987).
199. Breimyer, supra note 181, at 336.
200. Robert Wolf, The Regionalist Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 618 (2000);
cf Robert Wolf, Afterword, in AN AMERICAN MOSAIC: PROSE AND POETRY BY
EVERYDAY FOLK 314 (Robert Wolf ed., 1999) (describing "most of rural America" as "part
of the Third World").
201. Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 49 (2001).
202. ROSENN, supra note 16, at 21.
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Congress must therefore choose from a range of imperfect indexes.
Most if not all of its policymaking discretion lies arises from the
indexes' diverse shortcomings.
Two federal agencies compute different indexes designed to
reflect changes in purchasing power over time. First, the Department
of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes the Consumer
Price Index (CPI)113 Today, the BLS's broadest version of the CPI is
the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), which reflects changes in
the prices of all goods and services purchased for consumption by
urban households. It includes user fees (such as water and sewer
charges) and sales and excise taxes, but not income taxes and
investment items such as stocks, bonds, and life insurance. CPI-U
covers 87 percent of the United States population: urban wage
earners and clerical workers; professional, managerial, and technical
workers; the self-employed; short-term workers; and the unemployed,
retirees, and others not in the labor force. The BLS further
subdivides the CPI according to Census regions, specific metropolitan
areas, and major groups of consumer expenditures such as food and
beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care, recreation,
education and communications, and other goods and services.
Second, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic
Affairs (BEA) derives a gauge of inflation from its measurement of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)2 O The nominal, or "current-
dollar," GDP measures changes in the market value of goods,
services, and structures produced by the entire United States
economy in a particular period. The computation of a "real" GDP-
that is, one that purports to take account of inflation's impact on the
"nominal" GDP-yields an Implicit Price Deflator (IPD). The BEA
also computes four subcomponents of GDP: personal consumption
expenditures, gross private domestic investment, net exports of goods
and services, and government purchases. Each subcomponent carries
its own implicit price deflator. Like all versions of the CPI, the IPD is
expressed as an index that equals 100 in its base year.
The Gross Domestic Product is easily confused with the closely
related Gross National Product (GNP). In 1991 the BEA switched
from the GNP to the GDP as "the primary measure of U.S.
203. The information in this paragraph is based on the BLS's overview of the CPI. See
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report: Data for
January 2002, at 206 (2002) [hereinafter JANUARY 2002 CPI REPORT], available at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi.
204. The information in this paragraph is based on the BEA's commentary on its national
income and product accounts (NIPA) tables. See Eugene P. Seskin & Robert P. Parker, A
Guide to the NIPA's, 78 SURVEY CURRENT Bus., Mar. 1998, at 26, 36-40; Updated
Summary NIPA Methodologies, 81 SURVEY CURRENT Bus., at 18 (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/NIPAHelp.htm.
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production."2 5  Whereas the "GNP covers the goods and services
produced by labor and property supplied by U.S. residents," the
"GDP covers the goods and services produced by labor and property
located in the United States."2" Any difference between the two
measures arises from the gap between American investment abroad
(which is counted in the GNP but not the GDP) and foreign
investment in the United States (which is counted in the GDP but not
the GNP). Historically that gap has been trivial in the United States,
though the difference between GNP and GDP can be significant in
countries with wide, persistent gaps between domestic investment
abroad and foreign investment at home. °7
To some extent, both the CPI and the IPD languish in obscurity.
Even sophisticated lawyers sometimes mistakenly assume that the
Department of the Treasury "maintain[s] [a] cost-of-living index."208
But the CPI enjoys a decided edge in fame and political influence, at
least among "lawyers (and other amateurs).2 °9 Congress appears to
favor the CPI over the IPD by a factor of roughly ten to one."' Only
205. Gross Domestic Product as a Measure of U.S. Production, 71 SURVEY CURRENT
Bus., Aug. 1991, at 8,8.
206. Id. (emphases altered).
207. See id. A more fundamental attack on the GNP, the GDP, and other conventional
measures of social welfare stems from these indexes' failure to account for social and
ecological costs. Indeed, GNP and GDP count environmental cleanup expenses as
unmitigated macroeconomic gains without regard to the underlying impairment of
environmental performance. See generally, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR.,
FOR THE COMMON GOOD (2d ed. 1994); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and
the Macroeconomic Distribution of Law, 43 B.U. L. REV. 1, 28-36 (2001). Although a full
reconciliation of conventional accounting principles with ecological economics lies well
beyond the scope of this article, interested readers may wish to begin with Douglas Kysar's
provocative treatment of the subject. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2003). The narrower issue of ecosystem services has spawned an
extensive literature of its own. See, e.g., GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON,
THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE
(2002); NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns
from the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629 (1998); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24
ECOL. L.Q. 887 (1997); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000); James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr.
& Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2000).
208. Chicago Pac. Corp. v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 850 F.2d 334, 339 & n.2 (7th Cir.
1988) (concluding that the "substantially different results" of these indexes precluded judicial
correction of a poorly drafted pension plan that referred to neither the CPI nor the IPD).
209. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of
Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 241 (1983).
210. To be exact, searches of Westlaw's USC database on March 28, 2002, yielded 168 hits
for "consumer price index" and only 16 for "implicit price deflator". Applying Westlaw's
search restriction, "te" (which signifies "text" and in essence eliminates references found
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one federal statute prescribes the use of both indexes. When the
President "evaluat[es] an economic condition affecting the general
welfare" in determining federal employees' pay scales, he or she is
directed to "consider pertinent economic measures including, but not
limited to, the Indexes of Leading Economic Indicators, the Gross
National Product, the unemployment rate, the budget deficit, the
Consumer Price Index, the Producer Price Index, the Employment
Cost Index, and the Implicit Price Deflator for Personal Consumption
Expenditures.,
21 1
Across this panoply of statutes, one pattern does emerge:
Congress seems to prefer CPI-U in adjusting payments to individual
recipients in major entitlement programs. Congress has accordingly
conscripted CPI-U as its inflation index for adjusting the retirement
benefits of federal civil servants 12 and military personnel.23 Medicare
benefits"4 and old-age, survivors, and disability insurance payouts
under Social Security25 likewise include cost-of-living adjustments
pegged to CPI-U. To the extent statutes embody any discernible
(much less cogent) policy at all, these statutes must tacitly assume
that recipients of federal entitlements tend to buy the narrower range
of consumer goods and services tracked by CPI-U rather than the full
range of goods and services represented in the GDP and reflected in
turn in the IPD. In one instance, Congress has explicitly
acknowledged that the CPI and its subindexes may not be perfectly
solely in the historical notes accompanying individual sections of the United States Code or
editorially supplied cross-references), yields similar results. A search for te("consumer price
index") yields 136 hits, while te("implicit price deflator") yields 12 hits. A marginally broader
search for te("price index") yields an additional 18 hits beyond the te("consumer price
index") search. One can isolate those 18 hits by performing the following search: te("price
index") % te("consumer price index"). Details on these searches are provided in this article's
legal appendix.
I freely confess the methodological limits on the expedient LEXIS or Westlaw search,
which is perhaps the form of positive legal research most overused and abused in the
academy. The searches I performed, for instance, missed one statute defining "[t]he term
'real economic growth,' with respect to any fiscal year, [as] the growth in the gross national
product during such fiscal year, adjusted for inflation, consistent with Department of
Commerce definitions." 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(10) (2000). That reference unmistakably
identifies an inflation index reported by the BEA, though neither "implicit price deflator"
nor "Bureau of Economic Analysis" appears in the statute. Westlaw also reports false
positives: even the narrower te("consumer price index") search within the USC database
reported four hits referring to language found in the Code of Federal Regulations rather
than the United States Code. Nevertheless, a quick dip into LEXIS or Westlaw suffices to
suggest the relative weight that the United States Code as a whole accords to each of these
competing inflation indexes.
211. 5 U.S.C. § 5393(b)(2) (2000).
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(15) (2000).
213. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401a (2000).
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(h)(2) (2000).
215. See id. § 415(i).
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suited to the administration of Social Security programs.
Accordingly, Congress has directed the National Commission on
Social Security to investigate "the need to develop a special
Consumer Price Index for the elderly, including the financial impact
that such an index would have on the costs of the programs
established under the Social Security Act."' 6
Further examination, however, belies the legal process tradition's
quaint hope that Congress consists of "reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably."" 7  Indeed, the "contrary
[suggestion] unmistakably appears.""2 8 In all other circumstances in
which Congress chooses between the CPI and the IPD, it evinces no
discernible pattern. Ski areas operating under National Forest
System 9permits must pay rental charges adjusted according to
CPI-U,29 but cabin owners' user fees under the Forest System's
Recreation Residence Program reflect changes either in the IPD220 or
in the Department of Agriculture's Index of Agricultural Land
Prices.22t Royalties on "oil and gas lease[s] on submerged lands of the
outer Continental Shelf" are adjusted according to the IPD,222 but civil
penalties for violating leases, licenses, or permits relating to those
lands undergo annual recalibration according to CPI-U.
23
Nor does the Internal Revenue Code maintain a coherent
distinction between the CPI and the IPD. The Code uses the broad
CPI-U to index individual income tax brackets, 224 to sharpen
the valuation of debt instruments for purposes of capital gains
taxation,225 and to adjust the tax treatment of loans with below-market
interest rates.226 In delineating the deductibility of medical expenses
227
and the depreciation of luxury automobiles, the Code turns
(respectively) to the "medical care" and "automobile" subcom-
216. Id. § 907a.
217. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1st ed. 1958). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994).
218. HART & SACKS, supra note 217, at 1378.
219. See 16 U.S.C. § 497c (2000).
220. See id. § 6213.
221. See id. § 6207(a)-(b); cf. id. § 6213 (allowing the Secretary of Agriculture "[n]ot later
than 10 years after October, 11, 2000.... [to] select and use [a different] index.., if the
Secretary determines that a different index better reflects change in the value of a lot over
time").
222. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C)(vii) (2000).
223. See id. § 1350(b).
224. See I.R.C. § 1(f) (2000).
225. See id. § 1274A(d)(2).
226. See id. § 7872(g)(5).
227. See id. § 213(d)(10)(B).
228. See id. § 280F(d)(7)(B).
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ponents of the CPI. When the Code implements inflation-adjusted
phaseouts of tax credits for fuel produced from unconventional
sources,229 oil recovery, 230 and electricity produced from renewable
resources,23' however, it suddenly prescribes the IPD. Why prices for
helium sales by the federal government should be adjusted according
to CPI-U,2 2 while foreign aid to Palau 33 and to the Federated States
of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands3 should vary according to the
IPD, defies any credible explanation. These were lawmakers, after
all, who adjusted aid under a covenant of political union with the
Northern Mariana Islands according to the "United States
Department of Commerce composite price index"23 5-an apparent
invocation of the IPD-but later saw fit to exclude all inflation-based
adjustments from direct grant assistance to the Northern Marianas.236
The likeliest explanation for Congress's apparent preference for
the CPI over the IPD stems from the hectic, often haphazard nature
of legislative drafting. Legislative staffers routinely draft statutes by
copying provisions from older statutes. Justices Scalia and Stevens,
who frequently contest many interpretive issues,37 evidently agree
that legislative acts more fairly attributed to congressional staff than
to members of Congress should not be taken at face value. Naturally
wary of whether members of Congress "have genuinely considered
what their staff has produced, 238 Justice Scalia decries "modern-day
drafting" practices designed "not primarily to inform... Members of
Congress ... but rather to influence judicial construction., 239 For his
229. See id. § 29(d)(2)(B).
230. See id. § 43(b)(3)(B).
231. See id. § 45(d)(2)(B).
232. See 50 U.S.C. § 167d(c)(2) (2000).
233. See Compact of Free Association Between the United States and the Government of
Palau, § 215, 100 Stat. 3678, 3689 (1986) (set forth as Pub. L. No. 99-658, § 201,100 Stat. 3672,
3678-94 (1986), and codified as a note to 48 U.S.C. § 1681).
234. See Compact of Free Association Between the United States and the Governments
of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, § 217, 99 Stat. 1800, 1816
(1986) (set forth as Pub. L. No. 99-239, § 201, 99 Stat. 1770, 1800-35 (1986), and codified as a
note to 48 U.S.C. § 1681).
235. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, §§ 704(c), 803(b), 90 Stat. 263 (1976) (set
forth as Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 1, 90 Stat. 263 (1976) and codified as a note to 48 U.S.C.
§ 1801).
236. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804 (2000).
237. Compare, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687 (1995) (Stevens, J., writing for the Court, with Scalia, J., dissenting), with, e.g.,
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (Scalia, J., writing
for the Court, with Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 310 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
239. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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part, Justice Stevens has expressed his bemusement at legislative
mosaics, often given such ponderous names as "the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act," that combine "parts... photocopied from
memorandums, other parts handwritten at the last minute, and some
final sections hastily crossed out in whorls of pencil marks" with
"such cryptic and accidental entries... as a name and phone
number-'Ruth Seymour, 225-4844'-standing alone as if it were a
special appropriation item. 2 411 In reading any complex legislative
products, particularly when obscure references to price indexes are at
issue, we ought not assign too much weight to "legislative accident[s]"
that might be "caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that
Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should.,
24'
Federal agencies demonstrate no greater coherence than
Congress in choosing between competing inflation indexes. Federal
agencies prefer CPI variants over the IPD to roughly the same extent
as Congress. 242 To be sure, Congress has done its best to confuse the
Department of Agriculture by using the IPD to adjust fees charged to
241cotton producers for classification services while prescribing the use
of CPI-U in adjusting excess shelter expense deductions during the
computation of individual households' eligibility for food stamps.44
The use of CPI-U in the food stamp program is consistent with
Congress's general preference for this index in entitlement programs,
but that logic, applied exclusively within the Department of
Agriculture, would dictate the use of the BLS's Producer Price Index
to adjust fees for cotton classification services. Moreover, left to their
own devices, the food and nutrition programs at the Department of
Agriculture have managed to adopt on separate occasions the IPD ,245
the food away from home subcomponent of the CPI, 2 46 and an
outlandish blend of CPI-U, the CPI's food away from home
subcomponent, and the CPI's food at home subcomponent.247 Nor
does Agriculture stand alone in its confusion. The Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Land Management has somehow contrived to
adjust per-acre rental rates for rights of way through public lands
240. Sorenson v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 n.2 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1981, at A16).
241. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted); accord Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa
Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 255 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. A Westlaw search of the Code of Federal Regulations on March 28, 2002, disclosed
157 instances of "consumer price index" and only 19 of "implicit price deflator."
243. See 7 U.S.C. § 473a (2000).
244. See id. § 2014(e)(7)(B)(vi).
245. See 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(e)(4) (2002) (using the IPD in prescribing rules for state-level
implementation of electronic benefit transfer systems within the Food Stamp Program).
246. See id. §§ 210.4(b)(1), 225.9(d)(9).
247. See id. § 226.4(g).
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according to the IPD, while adjusting rental rates for identical rights
of waZ according to CPI-U when those rights favor communications
uses.
B. Consumer Price Index Versus Implicit Price Deflator
Taken as a whole, this legislative and administrative mosaic
suggests that policymakers arbitrarily treat the CPI and the IPD as if
they were interchangeable gauges of inflation. Even the D.C. Circuit
and the Seventh Circuit, two of the most economically sophisticated
courts outside Delaware, have casually equated the CPI and the
IPD.249 In a case involving natural gas pricing, presumably within the
Fifth Circuit's sphere of expertise or at least its comfort zone, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Gulf states implicitly equated the CPI, the
IPD, and the BLS's Wholesale Price Index.25° Only rarely does
Congress explain its preference for the CPI. In enacting the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), for instance, Congress indexed
regularly scheduled increases in natural gas price ceilings according to
a 0.2 percent premium over the IPD7' apparently in order to account
for what Congress perceived as a systematic gap between the CPI and
the IPD.252
The NGPA was a colossal failure in almost every respect, 53 but it
did identify a systematic gap between the CPI and the IPD. Even so,
248. See 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-2 (2002). This provision represents the sole instance in which
a codified federal regulation invokes both the CPI and the IPD.
249. See Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1517, 1521 n.68, 1524
nn.71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Amusement & Music Operators Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 676 F.2d 1144, 1155 (7th Cir. 1982) ("We do not believe that the objection ... to
the CPI as an appropriate measure of changing values of the royalty fee as measured in
nominal dollars should be accorded much weight. Other adjustment mechanisms, such as
the Gross National Product Price Deflator are perhaps available, but the CPI (even though it
measures a typical cost of living change) is broadly used as an appropriate reflection of
inflation, and we think its use in the present context is not arbitrary or capricious and is
adequately supported by substantial evidence.") (citation omitted).
250. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. FERC. 654 F.2d 435,443 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981).
251. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3311(a), 3314(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), repealed, Pub. L. No. 101-60,
§ 2(b), 103 Stat. 158, 158 (1989); Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United
Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 218, 221-22 (1991); Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana
Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 333, 334-35 & n.13, 342 (1983).
252. See H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-74 (1978); Steven M. Spaeth, The
Deregulation of Transportation and Natural Gas Production in the United States and Its
Relevance to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990's, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
43, 79 n.310 (1991); Steven M. Spaeth, Our Experience Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, and Its Relevance to the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, 12 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 265, 272 (1989-90).
253. See generally, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from
Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8-15 (1988); cf STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W.
MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974)
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Congress understated the extent of the divide. Throughout the last
quarter-century, the yearly gap between the indexes has routinely
exceeded 0.2 percent. Compounded over time, the gap between CPI-
U and the IPD has become quite substantial. I shall adopt as my
starting point the 1974 base rear stipulated in the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments. Y' The following table reveals an ever
larger gap between CPI-U and the IPD:255
(describing federal regulation of the natural gas market from the New Deal until the eve of
the NGPA).
254. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c)(2)(B) (2000).
255. Sources: JANUARY 2002 CPI REPORT, supra note 203, at 93-94; U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index/All Urban Consumers (CPI-U),
U.S. city average for January from 1974 through 2001 (last revised Mar. 21, 2002), available
at ftp://ftp.bls/gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt; GDP and Other Major NIPA Series,
1929-2001:1, 81:8 SURVEY CURRENT BUS. 121 (Aug. 2001); U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income & Product Accounts Tables, Gross
Domestic Product/Implicit Price Deflator, annual figures for 1974 through 2001, Table 7.1:
Account and Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product (revised Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableViewFixed.asp#Mid. I have chosen each January
as the arbitrary boundary between fixed twelve-month intervals, which marginally
outperform average annual price indexes in accurately depicting price changes. See
ROSENN, supra note 16, at 22.
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TABLE 1
COMPARING THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX-ALL URBAN
CONSUMERS AND IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR AS MEASURES OF
INFLATION OVER TIME
Year CP1-U IPD ACPI% AIPD% ACPI% Ratio Distortion
minus
AIPD%
1974 46.6 36.62 - - - 1.273 1.000
1975 52.1 40.03 11.80 9.31 2.49 1.302 1.023
1976 55.6 42.30 6.72 5.67 1.05 1.314 1.033
1977 58.5 45.02 5.22 6.43 -1.21 1.299 1.021
1978 62.5 48.23 6.84 7.13 -0.29 1.296 1.018
1979 68.3 52.25 9.28 8.34 0.94 1.307 1.027
1980 77.8 57.04 13.91 9.17 4.74 1.364 1.072
1981 87.0 62.37 11.83 9.34 2.48 1.395 1.096
1982 94.3 66.25 8.39 6.22 2.17 1.423 1.119
1983 97.8 68.88 3.71 3.97 -0.26 1.420 1.116
1984 101.9 71.44 4.19 3.72 0.48 1.426 1.121
1985 105.5 73.69 3.53 3.15 0.38 1.432 1.125
1986 109.6 75.31 3.89 2.20 1.69 1.455 1.144
1987 111.2 77.58 1.46 3.01 -1.55 1.433 1.126
1988 115.7 80.21 4.05 3.39 0.66 1.442 1.134
1989 121.1 83.27 4.67 3.81 0.85 1.454 1.143
1990 127.4 86.51 5.20 3.89 1.31 1.473 1.157
1991 134.6 89.66 5.65 3.64 2.01 1.501 1.180
1992 138.1 91.84 2.60 2.43 0.17 1.504 1.182
1993 142.6 94.05 3.26 2.41 0.85 1.516 1.191
1994 146.2 96.01 2.52 2.08 0.44 1.523 1.197
1995 150.3 98.10 2.80 2.18 0.63 1.532 1.204
1996 154.4 100.00 2.73 1.94 0.79 1.544 1.213
1997 159.1 101.95 3.04 1.95 1.09 1.561 1.226
1998 161.6 103.20 1.57 1.23 0.35 1.566 1.231
1999 164.3 104.65 1.67 1.41 0.27 1.570 1.234
2000 168.8 107.04 2.74 2.28 0.46 1.577 1.239
2001 175.1 109.37 3.73 2.18 1.56 1.601 1.258
I. . jA. DI [I. D-' _ All I f1 /_.......... A I. . . L
year reported. IDP: The implicit price deflator derived from changes over time in the real Gross
Domestic Product. ACPI%: year-to-year change in CPI-U, expressed as a percentage. AIDP%:
year-to-year change in the IPD, expressed as a percentage. Ratio: The ratio of CPI- U to the IPD.
Distortion: A measure of the cumulative gap between the CPI-U and the IPD as measures of
inflation, as reflected by the ratio between any particular year's CPI/IPD ratio and the CPI/IPD
ratio for the base year of 1974. Changes over time in ratios between price indexes over time
support comparative studies far more rigorous than this article. See Denison, supra note 82, at
256.
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Table 1 is by no means technically precise. Both the BLS and the
BEA have changed their methodologies several times since 1974,
thereby rendering it impossible to treat either CPI-U or the IPD as a
consistent index over this period. Comparative analysis of the two
indexes would be all the more treacherous. A serious reconciliation
of these methodological difficulties lies far beyond my reach. It
suffices to surmise that "[i]ncremental adjustment ... leads to
inconsistent measurement" and "puts us in a position of a driver
trying to gauge car speed while someone tinkers with the
speedometer. '  But statutory references to these indexes give full
legal effect to their reported results without accounting for the
nature, frequency, or magnitude of intermittent methodological
adjustments by their reporting agencies.
From the vantage point of legal expediency, if not that of
econometric precision, the macroeconomic glimpse captured in Table
1 suggests how dramatically CPI-U and the IPD can diverge. Year by
year, the two indexes do not differ substantially; the stretch from 1980
to 1982, during which CPI-U exceeded the IPD's measure of inflation
by more than two percentage points each year, is exceptional rather
than exemplary. According to the figures in Table 1, CPI-U reported
an average annual inflation rate of 5.025 percent, while the IPD has
increased every year by an average of 4.136 percent.2 57 But time's
cruelty reveals itself in the gradual distortion of the indexes. In 1974,
CPI-U was 1.273 times the size of the IPD. By 2001, the ratio of CPI-
U to the IPD ballooned to 1.601. Roughly speaking-and a
comparison as casual as this permits no greater precision-the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' narrower index reports approximately 25
percent more inflation from 1974 to 2001 than the index produced by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. A 25 percent gap between
inflation indexes over the course of 27 years is consistent with an
average annual gap of 0.9 percent, which corresponds almost
precisely with the amount that separates the average annual inflation
rates imputed from Table l's CPI and IPD data.25
That CPI-U overstates inflation relative to the IPD has been
known for years. When Congress in 1996 searched for ways to extend
the solvency of the Social Security trust fund, the Boskin Commission
advocated replacing CPI-U with the IPD in the computation of Social
256. Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Book Review, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 317,318 (1999).
257. For an explanation of how an average annual rate of inflation can be derived from a
price index purporting to measure inflation over time, see part A.1 of this article's
mathematical appendix.
258. For an explanation of how to estimate the aggregate gap between two divergent
inflation indexes from an annual gap, see part A.2 of this article's mathematical appendix.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
Security beneficiaries' cost-of-living adjustments.259  The Boskin
report estimated that the CPI overstated inflation by 0.80% to 1.60%
every year-a range which encompasses this article's far rougher
estimate of the annual gap between CPI-U and the IPD-and
ultimately advocated a 1.1% downward adjustment in the CPI. No
legislative action came of the Boskin report, however. The Social
Security system thus remains doubly indexed for inflation insofar as
the economy expands "earnings... upon which benefits are
calculated" and "the formula used to in computing benefits"
incorporates inflation." Reliance on CPI-U thus aggravates
inflation-driven growth in the federal government's Social Security
obligations.
The problem poses a macroeconomic threat in its own right, for
exaggerated Social Security payments may well spark inflation under
at least two theories of inflation: "demand-pull" and monetarist.6
Under the demand-pull theory, governmental expenditures combined
with consumption and investment spending in excess of the GDP will
spur an inflationary "gap." '262 And nothing raises governmental
spending like entitlement programs. After all, "[t]here is [only] one
sure way to achieve eternal life: Become a federal program.
263
Monetarism posits that "substantial changes in prices or nominal
income are almost invariably the result of changes in the nominal
supply of money.' '26' A monetarist critique would assault excessive
Social Security payments as another, opportunity for "too much
money [to] chas[e] too few goods.
2 65
Whatever the precise inflationary mechanism, the "failure to
correct the overindexing of social security can have serious
consequences," especially since the indexing or overindexing of
"transfer programs," coupled with the absence of indexing elsewhere
259. See generally Advisory Comm'n to Study the Consumer Price Index, Senate Finance
Comm., 104th Cong., Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living 20-64 (1996),
reprinted in GET'TING PRICES RIGHT: THE DEBATE OVER THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
(Dean Baker ed., 1998). The advisory commission and its report were known by the name of
the commission's chairman, Michael J. Boskin.
260. Gramlich, supra note 93, at 276.
261. The third dominant theory of inflation is the "cost-push" theory, in which increases
in wages and prices chase each other. See generally ROBERT J. GORDON,
MACROECONOMICS 192-98 (1978); Martin Bronfenbrenner & Franklyn D. Holzman,
Survey of Inflation Theory, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 593 (1963); Robert J. Gordon, The Demand
for and Supply of Inflation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 807, 819-23 (1975).
262. See generally, e.g., MARK R. EAKER & JESS B. YAWITZ, MACROECONOMICS 222-26
(1984).
263. Diane Ravitch, Adventures in Wonderland: A Scholar in Washington, 64 AM.
SCHOLAR 497,498 (1995).
264. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, MONETARY TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 19 (1982).
265. Id.
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in the federal budget, will propel lopsided growth in "the indexed
portion of the budget" relative to "the nonindexed portion."2 6 At
least the current Social Security program omits a truly baneful feature
that prevailed in the law of federal employee pensions until 1976:
deliberate indexing of these entitlements at one percent above
inflation as measured by the CPI during periods of prolonged, intense
inflation.267
The most recent round of campaign finance reform fared little
better in focusing congressional attention on the choice between
measures of inflation. The new $2,000 ceiling on campaign
contributions under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
falls well short of keeping pace with federal campaign finance law's
traditional $1,000 ceiling. According to the CPI-U figures in Table 1,
$1,000 in 1974 dollars would have a purchasing power of $3,758 in
2001. Using the IPD instead of CPI-U yields a figure of $2,987 in
2001 dollars. Choosing CPI-U over the IPD means that the revamped
$2,000 cap will rise faster than the ambient rate of inflation. Then
again, for the immediate future, reliance on a systematically
overstated measure of inflation will bring the new nominal ceiling of
$2,000 closer to purchasing power parity with the $1,000 limit
imposed in 1974.
Having established that CPI-U reports a higher rate of inflation
than the IPD does, I shall now explore more deeply the
methodological differences between these two indexes.
C. Madness in Their Methods
Why does CPI-U overstate the rate of inflation relative to the
IPD? Neither index provides a perfect gauge of inflation, and the
difference in their results arises from the indexes' divergent
methodologies. Every price index suffers from the same set of
limitations: changes in consumers' "market baskets," changes in the
quality of goods produced and consumed, disparities between
transaction prices and list prices, coverage limitations, sampling
errors, seasonal adjustments, and deliberate manipulation of index
results for political purposes.2'6 At least within the United States,
sampling errors and seasonal adjustments seem "quite
inconsequential,"2'6 and there is no evidence that the Labor and
266. Gramlich, supra note 93, at 280.
267. See Pub. L. No. 94-361, § 801(a) & (b), 90 Stat. 923, 929 (1976) (repealing earlier
provisions in 10 U.S.C. § 1401a(b) and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of
1964 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C. § 403) that prescribed an increase of 1 percent above
the CPI whenever quarterly inflation rates of 3 percent or more persisted at least three
months).
268. See generally ROSENN, supra note 16, at 27-32.
269. Id. at 31.
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Commerce Departments have devised distinct responses to political
pressure on their econometric missions. At the other extreme,
adjusting price indexes to reflect changes in product quality has
proved to be one of the most intractable issues in empirical
macroeconomics."7 ) Indeed, new goods and price changes in the most
technologically volatile product markets may outstrip economists'
ability to redefine market baskets, let alone their ability to track
prices within those baskets."' Once again, however, nothing suggests
that either the BLS or the BEA is outperforming its rival agency in
overcoming this major obstacle to the accurate reporting of inflation.
The BLS and the BEA do deviate with respect to their
definitions of the market basket and their responses to product
substitution and other consumer reactions to changes in price. Two
of their methodological differences will prove crucial. First, CPI-U is
a narrower index than the IPD. Second, whereas CPI-U uses a "fixed
market basket" methodology, the BEA adopts a chain-type approach
that ameliorates any fixed-weight index's vulnerability to substitution
effects traceable to changes in an economy's price structure. This
article will examine each of those methodological differences.
(1) Index depth
Consider first the depth of the "market basket" underlying an
inflation index. Though CPI-U is the most expansive index reported
by the BLS, it still falls far short of the coverage that the BEA
provides in computing the GDP and its underlying price deflator.
Two leading economists attribute the difference between the indexes
to this gap in coverage:
Economists often consider the GNP deflator to be a better measure
of overall inflation in the economy than the Consumer Price Index.
The main reason for this is that the two price indexes are based on
different market baskets.... [T]he CPI is based on the budget of a
typical urban family. By contrast, the GNP deflator is constructed
so that it includes every item in the GNP-that is, every final good
and service produced by the economy. Thus, in addition to prices
of consumer goods the GNP deflator includes the prices of
airplanes, lathes, and other goods purchased by business. It also
includes government services. For this reason, the measures of
inflation that these two indexes give are rarely the same."
270. See generally Brent R. Moulton & Karin E. Moses, Addressing the Quality Change
Issue in the Consumer Price Index, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 305 (1997).
271. See generally, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and
Imperfect Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 209 (Timothy F. Bresnahan &
Robert Gordon eds., 1997).
272. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
114 (5th ed. 1991) (emphasis in original); see also THOMAS H. WONNACOTr & RONALD J.
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One legal scholar has gone even further, claiming that the IPD's
status as "the most comprehensive index of prices in the United
States," especially its virtue of "includ[ing] all goods and services, not
merely those in a particular segment of the economy," makes it "a
better measure of general purchasing power of the dollar than such
better known indexes as the Consumer Price Index and the
Wholesale Price Index." '273 This is hardly surprising: from its modest
origins as the Department of Labor's effort to track the cost of living
in shipbuilding and industrial centers, which were prone to labor
disputes in the inflationary aftermath of World War I, the CPI has
never purported to cover all transactions in the American economy.'
At a minimum we can safely say that the CPI "fail[s] to cover
important areas of economic activity."
275
The inflation-based adjustment of attorney's fee awards under
the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1981 (EAJA) 26 vividly illustrates
how breadth affects the accuracy of an inflation index. EAJA entitles
a prevailing party in a lawsuit against the United States to collect a
fee award, including an attorney's fee, "unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially unjustified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.",2  Fee awards under
EAJA "shall be based upon prevailing market rates.., except
that.., attorney's fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per
hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of
living ... justifies a higher fee.
2
Unlike every other statutory scheme examined in this article,
EAJA fails to specify an inflation index. In making cost-of-living
adjustments in attorney's fee awards, however, no reported EAJA
decision has ever used the IPD. Instead, consistent with the Supreme
Court's assumption that the CPI should serve as the relevant
benchmark of inflation in assessing the adequacy of compensation for
lawyers, several lower federal courts have examined the proper use
WONNAcoTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 673-74 (4th
ed. 1990) (explaining the methodological limitations of the CPI).
273. Howard M. Friedman, Price-Level Accounting, Full Disclosure, and Rule lob-5: Half
a LoafIs Not Always Better Than None, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1013,1019 (1976).
274. See David Jabon, The Consumer Price Index: Measuring the Changing Value of
Money, available at http://qrc.depaul.edu/djabon/cpi.htm. See generally Philip J. McCarthy,
The Consumer Price Index, in STATISTICS: A GUIDE TO THE UNKNOWN 198 (Judith M.
Tanur et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989).
275. ROSENN, supra note 16, at 30.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
277. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A)' see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-63 (1988) (defining
"substantially").
278. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2000).
279. See FTFC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 443 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the low level of compensation for public
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of the CPI in adjusting attorney's fees under EAJA. Almost all of
these controversies arose during the early 1990s, after a decade in
which the price of legal services rose much more quickly than the
price of consumer goods and services in general.2 80  Legal services
comprise only a trivial portion of CPI-U, but roughly two-fifths of the
personal expenses subindex of the CPI. Several federal district
courts began adjusting attorney's fee awards under EAJA according
to the personal expenses subindex on the reasoning that the narrower
index more accurately reflected the sharp rise in the price of legal
services."'
None of those decisions survived appellate review. As between
CPI-U and the personal expenses subindex, the Second, Third,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have all required the use of CPI-U.283
EAJA's cap on fee awards reflected a congressional judgment that a
fixed hourly rate "adjusted for inflation" would provide "quite
enough public reimbursement for lawyers' fees, whatever the local or
national market might be. '' 2" By contrast, when the federal
government litigates in bad faith, EAJA's authorization of
"reasonable" attorney's fees under common law theories. 5 entitles
litigants to recover attorney's fees at full market rates.28' The statute
defenders by contrasting their legally fixed rates with "a 147 percent increase in the
Consumer Price Index"); cf, e.g., Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 521 n.1 (10th Cir.
1993) (observing that parties contesting the amount of attorney's fees nevertheless agreed
that the CPI would supply the proper measure of cost-of-living increases).
280. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 574, 575 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) (reporting that the
personal expenses subindex increased 107.7% between October 1981 and October 1991,
while CPI-U increased only 47.1% over the same period).
281. The remainder of the personal expenses subindex reflects the price of financial and
funeral services, as if to suggest that law is as inevitable as death and taxes.
282. See, e.g., Harris v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 968 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1992); DeWalt v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 27 (3d Cir.
1992).
283. See Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263,
265 (2d Cir. 1992); DeWalt v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1992); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958
F.2d at 567-77.
284. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988); accord DeWalt, 963 F.2d at 29;
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d at 577.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2000). See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of
Attorney's Fees Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 793 (1993)
(distinguishing between fees adjusted for the cost of living under § 2412(d) and market-based
fees under § 2412(b)).
286. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 1993); Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d
1075, 1080 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724
F.2d 211, 217 & n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953, 4984, 4987. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-60 (1975) (detailing the availability under common law
of attorney's fees for bad faith, willful disobedience of a court order, or other vexatious,
wanton, and oppressive behavior).
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therefore distinguishes between special, "common law" fee awards at
market rates and ordinary awards capped at $125 per hour, as
adjusted to reflect changes in "the cost of living." This distinction is
crucial. Although inflation obviously "affect[s] wages as well as• ,,211
prices, changes in the prevailing price of legal services are not
equivalent to inflation.
The narrower personal expenses subindex concededly
outperforms CPI-U in tracking the price of legal services. 8 Properly
accounting for price changes in "different sectors of the economy"
simultaneously improves the overall accuracy of an inflation index
and "makes it less accurate for cost changes within a single
industry."2"' But this feature is precisely what disqualifies the
personal expenses subindex as a reliable gauge of the broader cost of
living. By capping ordinary EAJA attorney's fee awards at $125 per
hour and instructing that this cap be adjusted prospectively according
to increases in the cost of living, Congress evidently intended to
ensure that lawyers receiving EAJA awards would continue over time
to enjoy purchasing power commensurate with $125 in 1996 dollars.2 9
At least as compared with its personal expenses subindex, CPI-U
more accurately approximates changes in the cost of living by virtue
of including a broader basket of goods and services.
"Beans, corn and hamburger may have appreciated less than an
hour of a lawyer's time," observed a district court that chose the
personal expenses subindex over CPI-U, "but plaintiffs must shop in
287. O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.);
accord Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523,540 n.24 (1983).
288. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d at 575-76 & n.4.
289. Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424,1435 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also id. at
1434 (observing that the IPD "directly reflects" changes in the price of "consumer services,
such as health care," which are paid "only indirectly, if at all," by firms such as oil pipelines).
For an administrative proceeding that used the implicit price deflator of the gross national
product in setting a price cap for a regulated oil pipeline, see Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53
F.E.R.C. $ 61,473,119 P.U.R.4th 543 (1990).
290. As enacted in 1980, EAJA provided a base rate of $75 per hour. See Act of Oct. 21,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a) & (c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2327, 2329. In 1996 Congress
amended EAJA to provide its current base rate of $125 per hour. See Contract with
America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 232(b)(1), 110 Stat. 847, 863.
Under either CPI-U or the IPD, the 1996 amendment effectively reduced the rate of lawyers'
compensation under EAJA. According to the CPI figures reported in Table 1, supra, $75 in
1980 translates to $149 in 1996 dollars. Using the IPD over the same period reports that $75
in 1980 dollars would have had the purchasing power of $131 in 1996. The IPD-adjusted rate
comes extremely close to the $125 rate that Congress stipulated in 1996. Insofar as Congress
rounded to the closest multiple of $25, its choice of $125 instead of $150 suggests that astute
congressional staffers may have used the IPD rather than CPI-U to account for inflation
since 1980. The 1996 amendment to EAJA, after all, was contemporaneous with the Boskin
report, which highlighted methodological imperfections in the CPI and advocated the
substitution of the IPD for CPI-based inflation adjustments in federal law. See supra note
259 and text accompanying notes 259-60.
[Vol. 54
the legal market, not the supermarket."2 ' This is one assertion whose
truthfulness confirms its invalidity as a legal proposition. The
shoppers that EAJA contemplates are plaintiffs' lawyers rather than
plaintiffs themselves. This focus on the purchasing power of
plaintiffs' attorneys, rather than that of plaintiffs, helps explain why
courts awarding attorney's fees under EAJA use CPI-U figures
applicable to the period when legal services were provided rather
than CPI-U figures prevailing at the time of the fee request."
In the battle to determine the best hamburger-inspired index of
economic indicators, The Economist's Big Mac index of purchasing
power parity defeats the CPI's personal expenses subindex hands
down. Although McParity relies on the pricing decisions of a single
corporate family, the McDonald's Corporation's activities come
closer to emulating global capital and commodity markets than the
personal expenses subindex comes to approximating the overall
consumption patterns of a typical plaintiffs' lawyer's family. But we
ought not allow this debate over "burgernomics" to distract us from
declaring the solution to EAJA's central econometric dispute.
Relative to the CPI's personal expenses subindex, CPI-U better
ensures that plaintiffs' lawyers can continue to buy roughly the same
amount of beans, corn, and hamburger as they could in 1996 by
earning $125 per hour.
291. DeWalt v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 195, 201 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 27 (3d Cir.
1992).
292. See, e.g., Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (5th Cir. 1992); Chiu v. United
States, 948 F.2d 711, 719-22 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Sisk, supra note 285, at 792-93. In addition,
applying changes in CPI-U after the delivery of legal services would effectively authorize an
interest charge against the United States, contrary to the variant on the rule of federal
sovereign immunity outlined in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986). But cf
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) to permit collection from the United States "the same interest to
compensate for delay in payment [as is] available... in [employment discrimination] cases
involving nonpublic parties").
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Indeed, the relationship between the personal expenses subindex
and CPI-U suggests that CPI-U should be viewed as a subindex of the
IPD. There is a basis in fact and in law for doing just that. CPI-U
comes closer to approximating the implicit price deflator derived
from the personal consumption expenses subcomponent of the GDP.
Federal law directs the President, in determining pay scales for
federal employees, to "consider ... the Implicit Price Deflator for
Personal Consumption Expenditures" as one of several "pertinent
economic measures" affecting that determination.29 Personal
consumption expenses represent that portion of the GDP not
reflected in gross private domestic investment, net exports of goods
and services, or government purchases. Table 2 demonstrates that
the relationship between CPI-U and the implicit price deflator of the
personal consumption expenses subcomponent of the GDP is closer
than the relationship between CPI-U and the implicit price deflator
derived from the broader GDP:...
293. 5 U.S.C. § 5303(b)(2) (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 211.
294. See sources cited supra note 255.
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TABLE 2
COMPARING THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND THE IMPLICIT
PRICE DEFLATOR OF THE PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENSES
5 1 IrC'-MPINFNT OF TI-IF, flRC'oss f"lMF, TIr PRODUCJfT
Year CPI PCX ACPI% APCX% ACPI Ratio Distortion
minus
APCX
1974 46.6 35.13 - - - 1.327 1.000
1975 52.1 38.01 11.80 8.20 3.60 1.371 1.033
1976 55.6 40.08 6.72 5.45 1.27 1.387 1.046
1977 58.5 42.73 5.22 6.61 -1.40 1.369 1.032
1978 62.5 45.78 6.84 7.14 -0.30 1.365 1.029
1979 68.3 49.83 9.28 8.85 0.43 1.371 1.033
1980 77.8 55.21 13.91 10.80 3.11 1.409 1.062
1981 87.0 60.08 11.83 8.82 3.00 1.448 1.092
1982 94.3 63.48 8.39 5.66 2.73 1.486 1.120
1983 97.8 66.19 3.71 4.27 -0.56 1.478 1.114
1984 101.9 68.63 4.19 3.69 0.51 1.485 1.119
1985 105.5 70.99 3.53 3.44 0.09 1.486 1.120
1986 109.6 72.72 3.89 2.44 1.45 1.507 1.136
1987 111.2 75.49 1.46 3.81 -2.35 1.473 1.110
1988 115.7 78.43 4.05 3.89 0.15 1.475 1.112
1989 121.1 81.86 4.67 4.37 0.29 1.479 1.115
1990 127.4 85.63 5.20 4.61 0.60 1.488 1.122
1991 134.6 88.91 5.65 3.83 1.82 1.514 1.141
1992 138.1 91.62 2.60 3.05 -0.45 1.507 1.136
1993 142.6 93.81 3.26 2.39 0.87 1.520 1.146
1994 146.2 95.70 2.52 2.01 0.51 1.528 1.152
1995 150.3 97.90 2.80 2.30 0.51 1.535 1.157
1996 154.4 100.00 2.73 2.15 0.58 1.544 1.164
1997 159.1 101.94 3.04 1.94 1.10 1.561 1.177
1998 161.6 103.03 1.57 1.07 0.50 1.568 1.182
1999 164.3 104.72 1.67 1.64 0.03 1.569 1.183
2000 168.8 107.52 2.74 2.67 0.07 1.570 1.184
2001 175.1 109.53 3.73 1.87 1.86 1.599 1.205
1 ..... t . .A ADUI. LAJ.... A A~~ flUC o An lLALA tt crn r . o, .*. ,~r d; lt JTr . .a.
year reported. PCX: The implicit price deflator derived from changes over time in the personal
consumption expenses subcomponent of the real Gross Domestic Product. ACPI%: year-to-year
change in CPI-U, expressed as a percentage. APCX%: year-to-year change in the PCX implicit
price deflator, expressed as a percentage. Ratio: The ratio of CPI-U to the PCX implicit price
deflator. Distortion: A measure of the cumulative gap between the CPI-U and the PCX implicit
price deflator as measures of inflation, as reflected by the ratio between any particular year's
CPI/PCX ratio and the CPI/PCX ratio for the base year of 1974.
After twenty-seven years, the implicit price deflator derived from
a mere portion of the GDP does deviate from CPI-U as a measure of
price change in the United States economy. In 1974 the ratio
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between CPI-U and the personal consumption expenses
subcomponent's implicit price deflator was 1.327. By 2001 that ratio
rose to 1.599. But the 20% deviation represented by that increase is
perceptibly lower than the 25% gap that has come to separate CPI-U
from the IDP over the same period. A 20% gap after twenty-seven
years is consistent with a 0.7% annual gap between two competing
inflation indexes, which happens to be the difference between the
5.025 percent rate of annual inflation projected by CPI-U and the
4.301 percent rate projected by the implicit price deflator derived
from the personal consumption expenses subcomponent of the
GDP.2 9'
(2) Fixed market baskets and chain-type indexes
Comparing CPI-U with the implicit price deflator derived from
the personal consumption expenses subcomponent rather than the
deflator derived from the GDP at large nevertheless leaves several
unanswered questions. The remaining 20 percent deviation is
undeniably substantial; whatever its virtues, closing five percentage
points still fails to explain roughly four-fifths of the gap between CPI-
U and the IPD. Moreover, the greater depth of the IPD's underlying
data-the entire gross domestic product-bears more on the IPD's
stability than on its reliability.
9 6
Therefore, to explain the remaining differences between CPI-U
and the IPD, we must look beyond the different compositions of the
two indexes. The truly significant methodological difference lies in
the choice between using a fixed market basket and pursuing a chain-
type, annual-weighted strategy. CPI-U reflects price change within a
fixed market basket, whereas the BEA chains together GDP data on
an annual basis. CPI-U's methodology is less responsive to
substitution effects traceable to price. A "fixed-weighted... index"
such as CPI-U cannot account for "the fact that the relative price
structure in the economy changes over time."" Consumers do not sit
idly as prices change; they shift their purchasing patterns to goods and
services that have become cheaper relative to their substitutes.98
Even when consumers do not adopt cheaper substitutes, changes in
price may prompt them to alter their usual practices in finding,
acquiring, and storing goods.299  Conversely, technological
295. See supra notes 257 and 258 and infra, mathematical appendix, Parts A.1 and A.2.
296. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1424, 1435 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
297. Allan H. Young, Alternative Measures of Change in Real Output and Prices, 72
SURVEY CURRENT BUS., Apr. 1992, at 32, 35.
298. See ROSENN, supra note 16, at 27; Jack E. Triplett, Economic Theory and BEA's
Alternative Quantity and Price Indexes, 72 SURVEY CURRENT BUS., Apr. 1992, at 49, 49-50.
299. See Robert A. Pollak, The Consumer Price Index: A Research Agenda and Three
Proposals, 12 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 69.
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improvements in consumer goods may prompt economic analysts to
report "a minor price increase or even a price reduction," even
though the ordinary consumer will "pay[] more money for a car than
[she] used to."3' No manageable inflation index can keep track of all
phenomena that may affect the marginal propensity to consume
different goods and services. Changes in income, taxation, and even
taste will affect consumption patterns, independent of changes in
price. These effects compound over time: "[t]he greater the change
in consumption patterns since the market basket survey" that
underlies a price index, "the more misleading the index" becomes.'
Two decades ago, a thorough study of substitution bias (on the basis
of 1958-73 data) estimated its distortion of the CPI at 0.1% per
year." A 1988 study, which covered a slightly longer period (1958-
85), concluded that substitution bias ranged from 0.14 to 0.22% per
year. 3
The IPD's clearest advantage over CPI-U lies in the IPD's ability
to accommodate many of the substitution effects not detected in a
fixed market basket methodology. The computation of the gross
domestic product more fully accounts for changes over time in
relative prices and in the composition of output. The BEA's
methodology for deriving the IDP ameliorates the inability of any
inflation index to detect all substitution effects. The following
depiction of an extremely simple economy emulates the BEA's
derivation of a price index from the computation of nominal and real
gross domestic product. The economic data that facilitate the
computation of growth rates and quantity indexes also give rise to
corresponding inflation measures and price indexes:"°
300. Jeff D. Opdyke & Michelle Higgins, What Deflation? Why Your Bills Are Rising,
WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at Dl, D2 (describing the phenomenon of "forced substitution").
301. ROSENN, supra note 16, at 28.
302. See Steven D. Braithwait, The Substitution Bias of the Laspeyres Price Index. An
Analysis Using Estimated Cost-of-Living Indexes, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 64 (1980).
303. See Marilyn E. Manser & Richard J. McDonald, An Analysis of Substitution Bias in
Measuring Inflation, 1959-85,56 ECONOMETRICA 909,925 (1988).
304. The following table is derived from an illustration of alternative measures of real
GDP in Young, supra note 297, at 41-43. Technical details are provided in part B of this
article's mathematical appendix.
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TABLE 3
NOMINAL AND REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, GROWTH RATES
AND QUANTITY INDEXES, AND INFLATION RATES AND PRICE
INDEXES IN A HYPOTHETICAL Two-COMMODITY ECONOMY
Year 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 5 6
REAL AND NOMINAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
PriceA 5 6 8 9 11 12
QuantityA 6 7 7 8 8 7
ValueA 30 42 56 72 88 84
Pricen  4 4 5 5 6 6
Quantity" 5 7 8 10 11 11
Value" 20 28 40 50 66 66
Nominal GDP 50 70 96 122 154 150(Y-p,q,)
Real GDP in 50 63 67 80 84 79
base year dollars





ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH AS MEASURED BY VARIOUS QUANTITY INDEXES
Fixed-weight - 26.00% 6.35% 19.40% 5.00% -5.95%
Laspe'res - 26.00% 5.71% 18.75% 4.10% -7.14%
Paasche - 25.00% 5.49% 18.45% 4.05% -7.41%
Fisher (chain- - 25.50% 5.60% 18.60% 4.08% -7.28%
type annual-
weighted)
REAL GDP INDEXES (YEAR 1= 100)
IFixed-weight I 100.0 I 126.0 I 134.0 160.0 I 168.0 158.0
Chain-type 100.0 125.5 132.5 157.2 163.6 151.7
ANNUAL INFLATION RATES AS MEASURED BY VARIOUS PRICE INDEXES
Fixed-weight - 12.00% 30.36% 8.22% 21.52% 6.25%
Laspeyres - 12.00% 30.00% 7.29% 21.31% 5.19%
Paasche - 11.11% 29.73% 7.02% 21.26% 4.90%
Fisher (chain- - 11.55% 29.86% 7.15% 21.29% 5.04%
type annual-
weighted)
PRICE INDEXES (YEAR I = 100?
IFixed-weight 1 100.0 1 112.0 146.0 1 158.0 1 192.0 1 204.0
IChain-tyP ee 100.0 111.6 144.9 155.2 188.3 197.8
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Table 3 depicts the very limited economy of the imaginary
Republic of Rockytop"' The Rockytop economy produces only two
commodities: alabaster (represented in Table 3 as commodity A) and
basalt (commodity B). From year 1 to year 6, the price of alabaster
increases from 5 to 12, while the price of basalt increases more
modestly from 4 to 6. Relative growth in the quantities of the two
commodities reflects the opposite pattern: whereas production of
basalt balloons from 5 to 11 over this six-year period, the quantity of
alabaster produced over the same period increases only from 6 to 7.
"Over long time spans,.., inverse relationships in the growth of
prices and quantities tend to be the rule" because "as changes in
technology or in market structure lower some relative prices and raise
others, buyers respond by demanding relatively more of the low-
priced goods and relatively less of the high-priced ones. ' '306 Price
tends to be the most significant driver of shifts in demand,
"outweigh[ing] any contrary effects arising from changes in taste or in
income levels.,
307
The nominal gross domestic product of Rockytop is easily
computed. Nominal GDP is merely the sum of the product of price
and quantity for all commodities. Real GDP is imputed from base
year prices. Table 3 treats year 1 as the base year. Multiplying the
quantity for each commodity in a later year by the price of each
commodity in the base year, and then adding all of these products
together, yields a fixed-weight measure of real GDP for the later year.
For instance, in year 4 the Rockytop economy produced 8 units of
alabaster and 10 units of basalt. Multiplying those quantities by year
1 prices-5 for alabaster and 4 for basalt-yields a real GDP in year 4
305. I pondered whether I should name this imaginary republic Ceresota in hunor of the
state where I have taught throughout my career, or Rockytop in honor of the up-country
South that will "always be home sweet home to me." "[Y]ears of cramped up city life
trapped like a duck in a pen" made it an easy choice. Rockytop is by far the simpler
economy, for "down in the [Georgia and] Tennessee hills" there "ain't no telephone bills."
Moreover, the alfalfa and barley that grow across Ceresota's grainy plains are alien to life on
Rockytop:
Corn won't grow at all on Rocky Top
Dirt's too rocky by far
That's why all the folks on Rocky Top
Get their corn from a jar
Boudleaux Bryant & Felice Bryant, Rocky Top (1967). You might think there is no legal
authority for any of these propositions, but there is. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-302(5)
(designating "Rocky Top" as one of Tennessee's five official state songs); id. § 4-1-322
(reprinting Margaret Britton Vaughn's "Who We Are," the official poem of the Tennessee
bicentennial (1796-1996), which lauds "'Rocky Top' and 'Tennessee Waltz' and the "'Star
Spangled Banner' before the game"). Substituting Ceresota for Rockytop and alfalfa and
barley for alabaster and basalt has no effect on this article's macroeconomic analysis.
306. Young, supra note 297, at 42.
307. Id.
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of $80 in year 1 dollars. Once real GDP is expressed in base year
dollars, simple arithmetic generates annual rates of growth and a
fixed-weight quantity index for the entire period.
The relatively simple fixed-weight methodology for computing
real GDP, however, depends on a crucial assumption: that prices and
levels of production during the base year provide the proper baseline
for deflating nominal GDP figures in future years. The trouble arises
from our inability to discern the exact extent to which base year
prices-here, 5 for alabaster and 4 for basalt in year 1-and base year
production levels were contingent on each other. Consumer demand
and corresponding levels of production, it must be remembered,
hinge heavily on price structure. Because "relative price structure in
the economy changes over time," a fixed-weight index "can only be
considered appropriate for comparisons in which both of the years
being compared have relative price structures that are approximately
the same as that of the base year."3 °8 The more that a later year's
price structure deviates from that of the base year, the less accurate a
fixed-weight index will become. In all likelihood, as changes in
technology, taste, governmental policy, and price magnify over time,
the predictive value of a fixed-weight index will degrade.
To overcome this defect, the BEA reports the GDP as a chain-
type annual-weighted index." The chain-type annual-weighted
methodology, which may be described as the macroeconometric
equivalent of the "oversampling" technique used to convert digital
recordings into analog sounds,' depends on a Fisher Ideal Index, a
"superlative index" that provides an accurate and workable
approximation of a theoretically "exact" cost-of-living index."' A
Fisher Ideal Index is derived from two underlying fixed-weight
measures, the Laspeyres index and the Paasche index. The Laspeyres
index "show[s] how much it would cost in the current period to
purchase the same market basket purchased in the base period." '312
The Paasche index "demonstrate[s] how much it would have cost
during the base period to purchase the consumer's current market
basket of goods." " The Paasche index "differs from" the Laspeyres
308. Id. at 35.
309. For a technical but highly readable guide to chain-type quantity and price indexes,
including comprehensive mathematical explanations, see Eugene P. Seskin & Robert P.
Parker, A Guide to the NIPA's, 78 SURV. CURRENT Bus., Mar. 1998, at 1, 26, 36-40.
310. See generally, e.g., DIETRICH SCHLICHTHORLE, DIGITAL FILTERS: BASICS AND
DESIGN (2000); Sampo Syreeni, Oversampling and Bitstream Methods in Audio (1996-2003),
at http://www.helsinki.fi/-ssyreeni/texts/bs-over/bs-over; Digital Audio: Oversampling
(1996), at http://www.earlevel.com/Digital%20Audio/Oversampling.html.
311. See generally IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS (1922); W. Erwin
Diewert, Exact and Superlative Index Numbers, 46 J. ECONOMETRICS 115 (1976).
312. ROSENN, supra note 16, at 23.
313. Id. at 24.
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index "in that it shows the ratio of actual current expenditures to a
hypothetical base period expenditure. 31 4 While comparing economic
data in two test years, a Laspeyres index holds constant the price and
quantity data for the earlier year. The Paasche index for the same
period holds constant all prices and quantities in the later year."5 In
mechanical terms, the Laspeyres index treats the sum of the product
of all prices and quantities from the earlier year as the denominator.
The Paasche index does the opposite: it uses the sum of the product
of all prices and quantities from the later year as the numerator. The
geometric mean of a Laspeyres index and a Paasche index produces a
Fisher Ideal Index. Recalibrating the Fisher Ideal Index each year-




Vis-ct-vis the fixed-weight approach of the CPI, the chain-type
annual-weighted methodology is more complex but offers a more
accurate picture of price change in the economy. "[T]he use of
geometric means" deprives the BEA's measure of real GDP (or any
other variant of the Fisher Ideal Index) of the "additive property" of
a fixed-weight index, so that "the contribution of each component to
a given change in real GDP is not readily apparent."3 '7 For instance,
each entry in the time series reported in Table 3 represents one year's
increase in real GDP. Constructing an index of real GDP from these
annually chained Fisher Ideal Index figures requires a few more
mathematical steps than the corresponding fixed-weight index, which
can be calculated simply by dividing real GDP in any given year by
the base year's GDP. By the same token, chaining the Fisher Ideal
Index on a yearly basis "portray[s] as accurately as possible, that is, as
accurately as any other indexes that could be calculated, the year-to-
year... changes in the economy over the entire period covered by
the index[].,,3 8 In Table 3, the fixed-weight index of real GDP and
the chain-type annual weighted Fisher Ideal Index diverge more and
more as the ratio between the price of alabaster and the price of
basalt increases from 1.25 (5 to 4) in year 1 to 2.00 (12 to 6) in year 6
and as consumers shift their demand in response to these changes in
price. Indeed, by year 6, there is a perceptible gap between these two
indexes: the fixed-weight index overstates growth in GDP by a factor
of 158.0 to 151.7.
All that remains is the derivation of an implicit price deflator
from the same economic data. Reversing the treatment of quantities
314. Id.
315. See Young, supra note 297, at 33, 42-43.
316. See id. at 34.
317. Id. at 35.
318. Id.
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and prices-holding quantities constant and allowing prices to vary-
yields inflation rates and price indexes that correspond to the real
growth rates and quantity indexes already reported. By multiplying
test year prices of alabaster and basalt by those commodities' base-
year quantities, we can determine the price of a base-year market
basket-namely, six units of alabaster and five units of basalt-during
subsequent years. Test year prices for this market basket generate a
preliminary measure of annual inflation and a fixed-weight price
index for the entire period.
The corresponding Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher Ideal price
indexes are computed in similar fashion. A Laspeyres price index
compares prices in a later test year with prices and quantities in an
earlier base year. Test year prices times base year quantities
represents the numerator, while base year GDP supplies the
denominator (as it does in a Laspeyres quantity index). A Paasche
price index computes what it would cost in test year dollars to buy a
base year market basket. Accordingly, it treats the test year GDP as
its numerator, just as a Paasche quantity index would, and multiplies
base year prices by test year quantities in order to derive its
denominator. In a time series of either price index, the annually
adjusted price of the past year's market basket takes the place of real
GDP, because market basket prices and real GDP begin diverging
after the base year. Of course, a Fisher Ideal price index is the
geometric mean of a Laspeyres price index and a Paasche price index.
As with the corresponding fixed-weight and chain-type annual-
weighted quantity indexes, Table 3's price indexes progressively
diverge as changes in price distort the base year price structure
underlying the market basket of a fixed-weight price index. By year
6, the chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal price index-
Rockytop's equivalent of the implicit price deflator-rests at 197.8,
roughly three percent lower than the 204.0 figure reported by the
fixed-weight price index.
Computing a Fisher Ideal price index by brute mathematical
force is not especially difficult, but even this modest exercise in
arithmetic is unnecessary. The Fisher Ideal Index, in either of its
manifestations, exhibits "a 'dual' property" that makes it very easy to
derive a price index from its corresponding quantity index and vice
versa.3" Dividing the change in nominal-dollar expenditures over any
period by one Fisher Ideal Index (quantity or price) yields the
opposite index.12  For instance, Table 3 reports that Rockytop's
nominal GDP in year 6 was 150, or exactly three times that republic's
nominal GDP of 50 in year 1. Dividing 3.000 by 1.517 (the chain-type
319. Triplett, supra note 298, at 5 1.
320. See id.
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annual-weighted Fisher Ideal quantity index for year 6, divided by
100) yields 1.978. Multipying that result by 100 elegantly reveals
Rockytop's chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal price index for
year 6: 197.8. This is the sense in which a price deflator is "implicit"
in the computation of the gross domestic product.32 '
One final note demonstrates the reach of Irving Fisher's
contribution to econometrics. The same techniques used to calculate
a Fisher Ideal price index can generate a Fisher Ideal index of
purchasing power parity. Adjusting price ratios according to the
output quantities in the base, or "numeraire," country yields a
Laspeyres PPP, while adjusting price ratios according to output in the
target country yields a Paasche PPP. The geometric mean of these
figures is the Fisher Ideal index of purchasing power parity.22 In this
fashion, the techniques that Fisher prescribed for improving the
comparison of income, price, and output data over time can also




In an undeniably dynamic world, inflation might seem one of the
easier sources of social change for the law to measure and to manage.
The range of real choices presented by inflation, however, stretches
far beyond a binary choice between indexing for inflation and not
indexing. Inflation thus presents the sort of polycentric problem that
typically demands legislative rather than judicial resolution.3 This
intuition may explain why statutes such as EAJA, which instruct
courts to account for inflation without specifying an index, appear to
be the exception rather than the rule. Even in EAJA, judicial
interpretations of "cost of living" closely orbit the legislative
consensus that payments under federal entitlement programs should
be adjusted according to CPI-U. On the other hand, the existing
United States Code represents a longstanding experiment in
committing this problem to legislative rather than judicial resolution,
and the results are anything but encouraging. Any evidence of
rational decisionmaking through legislation is strictly illusory.
321. For a demonstration of the "dual property" of Fisher Ideal price and quantity
indexes, which facilitates the rapid derivation of a price index from its corresponding
quantity index, and vice versa, see Part C.4 of this article's mathematical appendix.
322. See Mulder, supra note 50, at 286-87, 297.
323. Cf Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-




At least as a matter of statutory interpretation, if not as a matter
of constitutional law, Congress may choose to allow inflation over
time to augment tax revenues, to dilute the impact of a criminal fine,
or to tighten a cap on campaign contributions. In many other
circumstances, however, Congress orders some method of indexing
for inflation so that the taxes, fees, or entitlements it establishes will
keep pace with the economy at large. Comprehensive indexing plans,
such as Milton Friedman's proposal to peg much of the Internal
Revenue Code to a measure of inflation,' seek to minimize the
impact of price changes on macroeconomic policy. More aggressive
still would be a proposal not only to index the tax code, but also to
adopt a rebuttable presumption of indexation for all long-term
contracts3 2 Even in its more modest manifestations,326 indexing
represents an attempt to extend the life of carefully crafted legal
policies and thereby to move toward equilibrium in law.327 With
"delusive exactness" Congress overwhelmingly prescribes CPI-U in
those instances when it specifies an inflation index.32 But the deeper
economic database used to compute the GDP and the BEA's
dedication to a chain-type, annual-weighted methodology make the
IPD the smarter measure of price change. Congress's frequent choice
to cast its lot with the federal government's second-best measure of
inflation admittedly constrains judicial discretion in statutory
interpretation. The law may nevertheless retain some room for
exploiting this nugget of macroeconomic insight.
One legitimate advantage of the CPI over the IPD is that the
BLS publishes its figures on a monthly basis, while BEA goes
quarters between reports.329 This comes as no surprise, for a chain-
type, annual-weighted index demands far greater methodological
precision vis-d-vis a simpler index based on a fixed market basket. It
does seem somewhat arbitrary, however, to allow significant policy
choices to hinge on different federal departments' thirty-day and
ninety-day schedules for reporting complex economic information.
To be sure, whereas the BLS actively encourages official and private
324. See Milton Friedman, Monetary Correction, in ESSAYS ON INFLATION AND
INDEXATION 25 (Herbert Giersch et al. eds., 1974).
325. See ROSENN, supra note 16, at 393-95.
326. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 65-68.
327. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
328. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); accord Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 552 & n.33 (1983); Feldman v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, C.J., concurring dubitante).
329. See Win Whittaker, A Price-Level (Incentive) Regulation Proposal for Oil Pipelines,
46 OKLA. L. REV. 415, 432 (1993) (arguing that "the GNP deflator and the CPI have grown
at virtually indistinguishable rates" over time and ultimately favoring the CPI because "[t]he
GNP deflator is not available as timely [sic] as the CPI").
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reliance on all variants of the CPI as an economic indicator, a
deflator, and a means of adjusting income payments, the BEA
cautions against mechanical application of the IPD.
More generally, BLS price and wage data are much more readily
digested than corresponding information delivered by the BEA. The
difference is apparent to anyone with a computer. The BLS Web site,
unlike its BEA counterpart, provides extensive guidance-in lucid,
nontechnical prose-on the meaning and potential applications of
CPI data. The BLS even provides a pop-up "inflation calculator" that
computes the value of the consumer's dollar in two different years.
By contrast, the first page of the BEA Web site consists of a daunting
menu of technical reports and options for formatting GDP data
according to criteria whose relevance is opaque to the casual visitor.
The differences between the two Web sites are ultimately not that
great, for both Web sites provide extensive amounts of macro-
economic information and highly technical details on the production
and relevance of that information. But first impressions do count,
and the BLS Web site leaves a far friendlier aftertaste than the BEA
Web site.
Speed and simplicity both favor the CPI, for neither "[t]he
average accident trial" nor the typical congressional hearing
"should... be converted into a graduate seminar on economic
forecasting.""33 Even proponents of more complex, more accurate
indexes concede that users' "substantial investment.., in terms of
knowledge and experience" may warrant retention of a simpler,
fixed-weight index.31  On the other hand, the CPI's relative user-
friendliness may have arisen from a positive feedback loop: Congress
may have come over time to prefer BLS data because they are easier
to use, and any opportunistic agency would learn to convert
congressional affinity for its work-product into a continued stream of
financial and political support.
Finally, picking CPI-U over the IPD effectively accelerates the
rise of federal income tax brackets, Social Security cost-of-living
adjustments, and campaign contribution limitations. Powerful
political interests favor a systematic overstatement of inflation in
some legal settings, just as powerful countervailing interests motivate
the deliberate decision to ignore inflation altogether in other settings.
330. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); accord Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 548
(1983); cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 224 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decrying how
the Supreme Court's "criticism of the statistics relied on by [a] District Court conveys the
impression that a legislature in enacting a new law is to be subjected to the judicial
equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics").
331. Young, supra note 297, at 36. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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But none of these interests, all of which reek of naked wealth
transfers, presents a legitimate (much less an appealing) normative
basis for retaining CPI-U in favor of the IPD.33 In the end, the IPD
boasts a singular distinction: it performs better.
It may well be that the IPD offers nothing but "slight mechanical
advantages" over its BLS-computed counterparts,333 but the margin is
all that matters in economics. As trivial as a shift from CPI-U to the
IPD may seem, that change promises tangible dividends. Whenever
possible, Congress should consider and, where appropriate, adopt a
chain-type alternative to the fixed market basket index known as
CPI-U. When general price inflation is the economic phenomenon at
stake, lawmakers have no reason to forgo the best available gauge.
Statutes that do name an index may be amenable to legislative
amendment. It seems superficially appealing to amend Title 1 of the
United States Code to define phrases such as "inflation index" or
"cost-of-living index," '334 but this all-or-nothing solution would
ultimately inflict greater harm. Even a cursory glance at the hundreds
of statutes and administrative regulations making some use of CPI-U,
a subindex of the CPI, or the IPD suggests that there may be good
reasons for adopting different indexes. Whereas "a consumer price
or cost-of-living index" may best "enable an individual.., to buy the
same bundle of current consumption goods" over time, "a broader
index based on national income or net national product" will perform
better in "hold[ing] the ratio of taxe5 to national income the same
regardless of the price level." '335 An index that better reflects price
change in the economy at large is likely to malfunction when
commandeered to track prices within a single sector of the economy.
As the EAJA cases demonstrate, the reverse is also true.
Some statutory treatments of inflation may be improved without
legislative intervention. There may be room under existing law for
innovation through creative statutory interpretation or
implementation. Obviously courts may apply the IPD instead of CPI-
U under statutes such as EAJA or its administrative equivalent,33
332. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689 (1984).
333. ROSENN, supra note 16, at 394.
334. Cf., e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S.
194, 201-09 (1993) (interpreting the definition of "person" in 1 U.S.C. § 1 as applied to an
application for in forma pauperis status by an institutional litigant).
335. Aaron, supra note 80, at 22; see also Denison, supra note 82, at 244 (recommending a
"measure of average money income rather than of prices" for legislation intended "to
prevent an automatic rise in the government share" of national income, whether from real
increases in income or merely from higher prices). See generally Vito Tanzi, A Proposal for a
Dynamically Self-Adjusting Personal Income Tax, 21 PUB. FIN. 507 (1966).
336. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing a "cost of living" adjustment in an
attorney's fee award to a prevailing private party in a federal administrative proceeding).
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which authorize cost-of-living adjustments without specifying an
index for measuring changes in the cost of living. On the
administrative front, the BLS itself has promised a very significant
improvement in the CPI. In February 2002 the BLS announced that
it would supplement existing CPI data with a new Chained Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers, or C-CPI-U.337 "The new
measure.., is designed to be a closer approximation to a 'cost-of-
living' index than the" existing CPI-U, thanks to C-CPI-U's superior
ability "to approximate the effect of consumers' responses to changes
in relative prices. "3  But the United States Code is riddled with very
specific references to CPI-U, and "it is inconceivable that Congress"
before 2002 could have "intended a definition" of CPI-U that
referred to a methodologically enhanced variant of the CPI not
computed or released before 2002."3' Moreover, although C-CPI-U is
expected to reduce the existing CPI-U's inflation figures by an
average annual rate of 0.1 to 0.2%, that reduction covers only a small
portion of the apparent 0.9% annual gap between CPI-U and the
IPD.34" Then again, the BLS does plan to issue C-CPI-U on a monthly
basis, which would give this new index a decided advantage over its
BEA-produced rival. C-CPI-U seems ideally suited for indexing
inflation in federal entitlement programs. A consumer-oriented
market basket is arguably more appropriate than the United States
economy at large for measuring changes in the purchasing power of
veterans and retirees, and C-CPI-U's chain-type methodology
overcomes the CPI-U's fixed-weight approach. Finally, there is
strong reason to suspect that the BLS will announce C-CPI-U figures
before the BEA reports the personal consumption expenditures
subcomponent of the gross domestic product.
Where Congress has specified CPI-U as the appropriate measure
of inflation, however, agencies may not substitute the IPD for CPI-U
on their own initiative. The statute providing cost-of-living
allowances within the continental United States for pay to members
of the uniformed services vividly illustrates this point. That statute
authorizes cost-of-living adjustments based on either CPI-U or a
"comparable" index "developed in the private sector.,34' The IPD
may be "comparable" to CPI-U, but the Bureau of Economic
Analysis is assuredly not a "private sector" entity. The Secretary of
Defense could not switch to the IPD even if he or she so desired. In
337. See JANUARY 2002 CPI REPORT, supra note 203, at 9-10; U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Note on a New, Supplemental Index of Consumer Price Change
(Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpisuper.htm.
338. JANUARY 2002 CPI REPORT, supra note 203, at 9.
339. DeWalt v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).
340. See supra text accompanying note 258.
341. 37 U.S.C. § 403b(i)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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the language of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,3 42 "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question" at
hand, such that courts and the Secretary alike are obliged "to give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
344
It is tempting but ultimately unrewarding to recommend that
Congress delegate the task of measuring inflation to an administrative
agency. Congress has already done precisely that-twice. Moreover,
delegation will not relieve Congress of its political responsibility to
decide not only when but also how to index for inflation. Whatever
their methodological strategems and shortcomings, the BLS and the
BEA have merely devised measures of price change. Neither agency
has the jurisdictional reach or genuine political accountability to
make inflation-related policies across a broader spectrum of
legislative settings.
Alas, the only truly viable solution appears to be the brutal chore
of piecemeal amendment. An issue as obscure as the choice between
inflation indexes is likely to capture Congress's attention only when
individual statutes require reauthorization. The collapse of the
initiative to recalibrate Social Security cost-of-living allowances sets
an ominous precedent. If the prospect of extending the Social
Security trust fund's viability cannot motivate Congress, it is hard to
imagine what will. And even if Congress somehow finds the will to
act, a piecemeal amendment process is unlikely to rationalize the
existing patchwork of provisions responding to the problem of
inflation.
B. Regulatory: Perfecting Price-Level Regulation
Despite the prominence of inflation in economic regulation,
ratemakers have demonstrated a surprising reluctance to adopt a firm
measure of inflation. The failure to designate "an appropriate index,"
let alone the failure to explain "the proper relationship between the
appropriate inflation rate and the lower limit of the zone of
reasonableness" for regulated rates, is reversible error.345 At least
where conventional rate-of-return regulation still holds sway, the
choice between the CPI and the IPD should be a simple one. In
traditional rate regulation, the appropriate benchmark is the
opportunity cost to the holder of a regulated firm's common stock of
342. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
343. Id. at 842.
344. Id. at 843.
345. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. FERC, 654 F.2d 435, 443 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1524 nn.71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(observing that FERC had failed to correlate changes in a rate base with inflation, whether
measured by the CPI or by the IPD).
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making that equity investment. Insofar as utility investors anticipate
nothing more and nothing less than being "better off by investing
dollars in [the regulated firm's] securities than by buying real things at
the time of investment,"' 6 the appropriate inflation index for all
traditional ratemaking applications is the broadest available: the
price deflator implied by the BEA's computation of gross domestic
product.
A relatively new approach to ratemaking sheds crucial light on
the proper use of inflation in economic regulation. Price-level
regulation is a leading alternative to the traditional technique of
monitoring a regulated firm's profits.3 47 The idea is conceptually
simple. In lieu of traditional regulatory obligations imposed by legal
restraints on the regulated firm's profitability-which force regulators
to review the prudence of the firm's operating costs, assess the value
of its productive assets, determine an appropriate rate of return, and
account for the impact of taxes and depreciation-the price-level
alternative entitles a regulated firm to conduct its business as it sees
fit, provided that its prices do not rise above a certain level.
Price-level regulation responds to three severe defects in
conventional cost-of-service regulation.48 First, perverse incentives
result from a regulated firm's ability to pass operating costs through
to ratepayers and to collect a return on all investment it can
characterize as "prudent."' The most celebrated manifestation of
this problem is the Averch-Johnson-Wein hypothesis, which posits
that firms guaranteed a "just and reasonable" rate of return will
overinvest to the extent that rate regulation shields them from the
discipline of the marketplace.35°  Second, the impossibility of
extending a regulatory scheme to all business activities ostensibly
346. Webb, supra note 147, at 847.
347. For an overview of the technique, see JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD R.
BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES: AN
ASSESSMENT (1989). For a sense of the controversy that the technique has sparked,
compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level Regulation Based on Inflation Is Not an Attractive
Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 665 (1990) with Jordan J. Hillman
& Ronald R. Braeutigam, The Potential Benefits and Problems of Price Level Regulation: A
More Hopeful Perspective, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 695 (1990). On regulatory reform generally,
see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
348. See Nat'l Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Policy &
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786, 6791, 6853 & n.450 (1990),
on reconsideration, 6 F.C.C.R. 2637 (1991).
349. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002); National
Rural Telecom Ass'n, 988 F.2d at 178.
350. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Harold H. Wein, Fair Rate of Return and
Incentives-Some General Considerations, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 39
(Harry M. Trebing ed., 1968).
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within the reach of a natural monopolist35' gives rise to that hoary
practice of regulated firms, shifting money between regulated and
unregulated lines of business.352 Finally, conventional rate-of-return
regulation is slow and expensive. Of course, as if to prove the
regulatory command, "Thou Shalt Not Optimize in Piecemeal
Fashion,""'s the failure to complete the conversion of a rate-of-return
regulatory scheme to its price-level equivalent leaves a firm free to
"escape the burden of costs incurred in its unregulated or price cap
business by shifting them to [a] rate-of-return affiliate, which can pass
them on to ratepayers.
354
Price-level regulation relies entirely on various benchmarks of
prices. After regulators determine the initial level, an effective price
cap "require[s] annual adjustments to the [firm's] price cap indices for
inflation and certain 'exogenous' changes outside the [firm's] control,
coupled with a percentage offset for anticipated productivity gains." '355
The maximum allowable price thus varies over time according to two
adjustments: (1) upward, generally, as prescribed by a gauge of
general inflation and (2) downward in anticipation of the extent to
which "the [regulated] industry [will] experience[] faster productivity
growth than the economy generally." '356 The downward adjustment of
a price cap begins by deriving a "minimum productivity offset"-a so-
called "X-Factor"-from historical trends of long-term productivity
growth in the regulated industry (most typically telecommuni-
cations). 7 It then adds a further "consumer productivity dividend,"
which is designed to reflect the "greater productivity gains" realized
solely by virtue of the transition from rate-of-return regulation to the
incentive-laden system of price-level regulation.358
According to the D.C. Circuit, "[t]he X-Factor is aimed at
capturing a portion of expected increases in carrier productivity, so
351. That the task is impossible does not keep regulators, t la Sisyphus, from trying and
trying again. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
352. See, e.g., Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922);
Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
353. Gregory S. Crespi, Market Magic. Can the Invisible Hand Strangle Bigotry?, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 991, 1010-11 (1992); see also Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 641, 652 (1980) ("The general theory of second best demonstrates that if there are
distortions from competitive equilibrium throughout the economy due to taxes or monopoly,
for example, a change that can be viewed as value maximizing in one small sector may
actually decrease value overall.") (footnote omitted). See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
354. Nat'l Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
355. Bell Atd. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
356. Id.
357. See id.
358. Id. at 1198.
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that these improvements, as under competition, will result in lower
prices for consumers., 359  The X-Factor assumes "that historic
productivity increases will be matched in the future."3 ' In a
controversy involving price-level regulation of local exchange
companies (LECs), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
computed the X-Factor "as the sum of the difference in productivity
growth and the difference in input price growth between the LECs
and the economy as a whole. 3 6' The "FCC's general rule that the X-
Factor is to 'provide a reliable measure of the extent to which changes
in the LECs' unit costs have been less than the change in level of
inflation' can be expressed in manageable mathematical terms: "X =
U - L, where U is the 'change in level of inflation,' and L is the
change in the LECs' unit costs." 3 62 Unit costs, whether realized within
a regulated firm or in the economy at large, change according to two
factors: changes in productivity and changes in input prices.363
Therefore, L is readily conceptualized through the equation, "L = A%
LEC input price - A% LEC productivity."3  Treating "'change[s] in
unit costs in the economy as a whole"' as changes attributable to
inflation yields a similar expression for U: "U = A% U.S. input price
- A% U.S. productivity. 3 65 Insofar as the FCC "also increases the cap
by general price inflation," the combined effect of an inflation-
adjusted price cap and a productivity-sensitive X-Factor is "to
increase the cap by the LECs' estimated change in unit costs.
366
Although most of the litigation over price-level regulation has
centered on the computation of the X-Factor and the consumer
productivity dividend, the choice of an inflation index (which after all
is the primary force driving prices upward in a regulatory scheme of
this sort) remains crucial. Precisely because an "inflation index"
represents a "factor[] outside of [entrepreneurial] control," a
359. United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521,524 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
360. Id.
361. Id. The D.C. Circuit provided a more formal explanation. According to the appeals
court, the X-Factor
can thus be expressed as follows: X = (A% LEC TFP - A% TFP) + (A% U.S.
input prices - A% LEC input prices), where TFP = total factor productivity. The
formula may be more readily conceptualized as X = (A% LEC TFP - LEC input
prices) - (A% U.S. TFP - A% U.S. input prices).
Id. at 524-25.
362. Id. at 525 n.1 (citation omitted).
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Id. "Substituting these values into the equation X = U - L, using 'TFP' for
preductivity, and performing a little algebraic manipulation yields the equation" described
supra in note 361.
366. Id. ("It is somewhat as if the overall adjustment ('A') were... A = U - X = U - (U -
L) = L.").
July 20031
regulated firm should "have little incentive to shift costs from
nonregulated activities to regulated ones because it would not be able
to increase regulated rates to recapture those costs." '367 The most
elaborate illustration of the impact of inflation on price-level
regulation comes not from telecommunications, but rather the
technologically stagnant realm of oil pipelines.3" The Energy Policy
Act of 1992369 directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to adopt streamlined procedures for setting oil pipeline
rates." FERC complied by issuing an order that adopted rates
approved in the 1992 Act as a baseline and set caps for future rate
increases according to an inflation index:
In Association of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC,372 the D.C. Circuit
characterized the purpose of FERC's "indexed ratemaking
methodology" as one of "enabl[ing] pipelines to recover costs
by ... rais[ing] rates at the same pace as they are predicted to
experience cost increases." 37 3  "Of central importance to the
Commission's scheme [was] its choice of index., 374 The oil pipeline
industry proposed the implicit price deflator of the gross domestic
product, which the D.C. Circuit described as "a macroeconomic
indicator of overall inflation in the economy." '75 FERC countered
with what it called "PPI-1%"-the producer price index minus one
percent-and derived from "a macroeconomic measure of inflation"
using "a fixed-weight index of commodity prices taken at the
producer level" to track "price changes for commodities that will not
undergo further processing., 376  Although FERC staff originally
characterized the adoption of "an index one percent lower than the
PPI as 'an offset for productivity,"' the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld
367. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1994).
368. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
with approval how "FERC opted for a purely historical analysis" in imposing price caps on
oil pipeline rates "and has adhered to it" in order to avoid "embroil[ing] itself in the
complexity and iffiness" of the FCC's technologically dynamic but ill-fated "forward-looking
methodology" that was invalidated in United States Tel. Ass'n, 188 F.3d at 527).
369. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
370. See id. §§ 1801-1804, 106 Stat. at 3010-12 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7172 note (2000)).
371. See Order No. 561, Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,753 (Nov. 4, 1993), on reh'g sub nom., Order No. 561-A,
59 Fed. Reg. 40,243 (Aug. 8,1994).
372. 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
373. Id. at 1430.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1430 n.10.
376. Id. at 1430 n.9.
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the lowered index as "the most likely formula to keep rates at their
real value."3"
The oil pipeline ratemaking dispute, however, centered on the
choice between a narrower producer price index and the broader
implicit price deflator. The Commission rejected the broader index
principally because of its breadth. The "GDP-IPD index," it alleged,
"directly reflects rapid inflation in consumer services, such as health
care," which oil pipelines buy "only indirectly, if at all." '378 Moreover,
because the implicit price deflator "reflects changes in the
composition of the GDP" at large, FERC complained that this index
"is upwardly biased due to the growing size of inflationary sectors of
the economy." '379 The D.C. Circuit agreed. According to the court,
the IPD's fatal flaw lay in the "fact that the [index] reflects changes in
the relative weights of different sectors of the economy," which
renders the IPD "less accurate for cost changes within a single
industry."3'8
The court also took pains to distinguish FERC's embrace of a
PPI-based index from the Commission's earlier deployment of a
broader implicit price deflator in Buckeye Pipe Line Co.38' Buckeye
approved an experimental program under which a pipeline would be
relieved of regulatory supervision of rates in markets where it lacked
market power, as long as prices charged did "not exceed the change
in the GNP deflator since the rate was last increased, plus 2
percent. 38 2 Confining Buckeye to the circumstances of "a pipeline
without market power," the D.C. Circuit declined to allow that
decision to impugn FERC's "different purpose[s]" in adopting "the
indexing rate cap" at issue in Association of Oil Pipe Lines.
3
At a visceral level, the D.C. Circuit's endorsement of PPI-1% in
Association of Oil Pipe Lines is quite easily understood. FERC chose
that index because it would outperform IPD in restraining the growth
of oil pipeline rates. The Producer Price Index, which like the CPI is
reported by the BLS, appears to rise more slowly than either CPI-U
or the IPD, two broader indexes that are alleged to be "upwardly
biased due to the growing size of inflationary sectors of the
economy. '"" From 1986 to 2001, the Producer Price Index for all
377. Id. at 1435; see also id. at 1436 ("[E]mpirical evidence in the record demonstrates that
the application of the PPI-1% to the total pipeline rate.., was a better historical measure of
pipelines' cost experience [than other alternatives before FERC.]").
378. Id. at 1434.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1435.
381. 53 F.E.R.C. $ 61,473 (1990), on reh'g, 55 F.E.R.C. $ 61,084 (1991).
382. Id. at 62,675.
383. 83 F.3d at 1436.
384. Id. at 1434.
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manufacturing industries in the United States rose from 98.4 to a
preliminary figure of 134.6."' That increase of 36.7% is less than the
corresponding increases in each of the following inflation indexes
over the same fifteen-year period: a 59.8% increase in CPI-U, a
50.6% increase in the implicit price deflator derived from the
personal consumption expenses subcomponent of gross domestic
product, and a 45.2% increase in the broader IPD.3 6
But it is gross legal error for regulators to shove rates downward
simply because they can. "[T]he principle that 'lower is better,"'
when presented as "an argument that seems to have no end and little
connection to any stated purpose," provides no basis for affirming a
ratemaking decision.3" It is bizarre, on multiple grounds, for
regulators to rely on any measure derived from the PPI instead of
IPD or any other measure of general price inflation. First, the whole
point of price-level regulation and price caps is to remove a
ratemaking agency's entanglement with the cost of any regulated
firm, including oil pipelines. A price cap can reduce or eliminate the
tendency of a rate-regulated firm to be "dissuaded from cost cutting
efforts" by conventional cost-of-service ratemaking, but only insofar
as the cap is "disconnected from individual firm costs.""" Even the
imperfect alternative of adjusting rates according to an index of costs
throughout the industry helps ensure that "no one pipeline's cost
experience has much impact on the caps to which it is subject." '389 It
therefore makes no sense to adjust a price cap according to a measure
chosen specifically for its ability to reflect individual pipelines' costs.
At worst, calibrating price-level regulation according to the regulated
firm's actual costs or to some exogenous measure purporting to
measure those costs comes perilously close to "permit[ting] [a]
regulated compan[y] to select the rate of return index" that offers it
the most generous rates.w
Second, insofar as the goal of a price cap is to enhance the firm's
incentive to cut costs and perhaps to innovate while protecting
consumers against price gouging, it makes no sense to use a measure
of the industry's operating costs-over which it has some control,
even if it is attenuated-as opposed to a measure of price change in
the economy at large. No monopolist, regardless of its size, can
plausibly affect general price inflation in the United States economy.
385. See http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet (reporting Current Series
PCUOMFG# as of Apr. 16,2002).
386. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
387. Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 247.
390. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Third, the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of utility
company shareholders are based strictly on the opportunity cost of
their investment in the regulated firm. Nothing in contemporary
regulatory reform undermines the rule that a measure of general
inflation is most appropriate for protecting the expectations of utility
investors. Old-fashioned regulation of agricultural commodity prices
did rely on parity, a gauge of farmers' purchasing power that is quite
similar conceptually to the contemporary producer price index. But
no one has ever accused agricultural regulation of being designed to
protect consumers.391  The analogy to parity pricing of farm
commodities reveals how a purported interest in shielding consumers
from high rates is an utterly implausible excuse for pegging a price
cap for oil pipelines to an index of prices paid by those pipelines.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit's characterization of Buckeye is simply
wrong. FERC's endorsement of a pricing experiment in that
proceeding represented one of that agency's steps toward
deregulation before the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. In
the oil pipeline and wholesale electricity markets, FERC had begun
to relax conventional rate-of-return regulation whenever a regulated
firm could demonstrate the absence of market power. As of 1990, in
the bulk electricity market, FERC had already taken the more
aggressive step of permitting purely market-based prices."2 After the
passage of the 1992 Act, FERC eventually adopted market-based
sales as a general policy in its regulation of wholesale electricity
markets.3 93 The presence of a price cap of any sort in Buckeye
suggests that FERC's reform of oil pipeline regulation was
conservative relative to the agency's revision of its approach to the
electricity market.
"Like agency ratemaking, price cap regulation.. . 'involves
policy determinations in which the agency is acknowledged to have
expertise."'394 It is also true that "a reviewing court must generally be
at its most deferential" when an agency "is making predictions, within
its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science., 39' But review
of administrative decisions routinely requires judges to "acquire the
391. Cf, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348-52 (1984) (denying
standing to consumers to challenge federal milk marketing orders, on the reasoning that the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 confines participation in legal disputes over
those orders to the Secretary of Agriculture, dairy producers, and wholesale handlers of
milk). See generally Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809 (1995).
392. See Public Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367 (1990).
393. See Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
394. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Time Warner
Entmt. Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
395. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def, Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983); see also, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980)
(plurality opinion); id. at 705-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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learning pertinent to complex technical questions in such fields as
economics, science, technology and psychology. 39 6 Judges "should
not automatically succumb" to regulators' "acknowledged
expertise... overwhelmed as it were by the utter 'scientificity" of the
ratemaking process. 97 "Restraint, yes, abdication, no.''  In a future
case involving price-level regulation, the reviewing court should not
hesitate to challenge a ratemaking agency's decision to use firm- or
industry-specific price index in lieu of the broadest available measure
of price change in the economy at large.
C. Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis of Law
Law, so we are told, no longer functions in isolation from other
learned disciplines. 9' A jurisprudential culture that has embraced (or
at least learned to accommodate) microeconomic analysis of law
should be able to take the comparably modest step of contemplating
a little legal analysis of macroeconomics. Congress has overlooked its
full range of options for incorporating an element of macroeconomic
dynamism into federal statutory law. Nor have decisionmakers-
whether administrative or judicial-in the chain of command over
federally regulated rates provided a persuasive explanation for the
use of a producer price index instead of the IPD in price-level
regulation. Neither congressional discretion nor "the dictates of the
First Amendment are ... mere functions of the Consumer Price
Index."4°
Although inflation affects numerous areas of law, existing legal
solutions hardly demonstrate a coherent approach, let alone inspire
public confidence. At a minimum, we should distinguish between the
econometric problems that beset the accurate measurement of price
change and the political preferences that inform any decision to index
for inflation or any choice among inflation indexes.' This article has
396. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); cf Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670
(1981) (plurality opinion) (expressing a willingness to invalidate "marginally" effective and
"substantially" obtrusive state laws despite state officials' claimed expertise over regulations
designed "to promote the public health or safety"); Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v.
Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943) (describing agriculture as a field "so vast that fully
to comprehend it would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology,
biology, chemistry and medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and administrative
processes of government").
397. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
398. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
399. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
400. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
401. Cf Angus Deaton, Getting Prices Done: What Should Be Done?, 12:1 J. ECON.
PERSP. 37 (Winter 1998) (refusing to accept as "essentially obvious" the suggestion that a
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described the strictly econometric problem in the hope of framing
future debate over the inexorably prescriptive choices presented by
inflation. "Even in this seemingly simple area, highly complex
judgments are called for if legislative desires, majoritarian needs, and
the demands of continuity and change are to be met in a system that
never stands still technologically or sociologically. "4'2 No less than
adjudication ex post, legislative and regulatory prescription ex ante
demands both an expectation of imperfection and an enduring
commitment to reinvention.
Mathematical Appendix
A. The Relationship Between Inflation Rates and Inflation Indexes
Text accompanying notes 257 and 295 refers to average annual
rates of inflation derived from CPI-U, the IPD, and implicit price
deflator derived from the personal consumption expenses
subcomponent of the GDP. Text accompanying notes 258 and 295
refers to correlating long-term gaps between competing inflation
indexes with the average annual differences attributable to systematic
methodological differences in those indexes. Explanations follow.
(1) Determining the average annual rate of inflation from a price index
Rates of inflation over time cannot be computed arithmetically
(i.e., via a simple division of the change in the consumer price index
by the number of years elapsed). It is necessary to apply a formula
reflecting the geometric compounding of prices. That formula
consists of subtracting 1 from the nth root of the ratio of the value of
a price index during its final year to the price index's value during its
first year, where n represents the number of years between the first
and last years reported within the price index. If t represents the last
year reported in an index and s represents the first year, then n equals
t minus s. Thus the formal expression of the annual average inflation
rate formula:
r = i- 1 (Eq. Ala)V IX
where IX represents the value of an inflation index in any particular
year.
An approximation that avoids the awkward mathematical
operation in equation Ala takes advantage of the definition of e:
cost-of-living index can and should measure consumer prices and asserting instead that this
"contentious proposition ... requires serious argument").
402. CALABRESI, supra note 14, at 68.
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( >X
ey =im 1 +1 (Eq. Alb)
A few algebraic transformations of equation Ala yield a reasonable
approximation of the inflation rate whose accuracy improves as the
time gap (represented by t - s) increases.
+r= t-SIX t  (Eq. Alc)l + " I s
IX
( + r t  (Eq. Aid)
+ (t-s) = (Eq. Ale)
(tIX)) ,
er(t- s ) _i (Eq. Alf)
IXs
r(t - s) = 1nIXs  (Eq. Alg)
l ( IXt
r =-- IX s  (Eq. Alh)
t-s
(2) Correlating long-term gaps between competing inflation indexes with
average annual gaps
Determining the long-term gap between two inflation indexes
(such as CPI-U and the IPD) from average annual gaps likewise
requires a formula accounting for the geometric compounding
implicit in any inflation index. So too with the reverse project of
translating an annual gap into a long-term gap. For instance, after 27
years, an annual difference of 0.9 percent in the inflation rates
reported by two indexes will compound into an aggregate difference
of roughly 25 percent. Raising (1 + annual gap) to the number of
years that have elapsed provides a good working estimate.
Conversely, taking the 27th root of the ratio between the higher index
and the lower index reveals the average annual difference in the
inflation rates reported by those indexes. Thus, the 25.8 percent gap
that arose from 1974 to 2001 between CPI-U and the IPD translates
to the 27th root of 1.258 minus 1, or 0.85 percent.
As with equation Ala, this process is mathematically awkward.
An application of equation Alb, which defines the computation of an
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inverse natural logarithm, can provide an elegant shortcut. Let the
difference between inflation rates reported by two different indexes
be represented by Ar. If the indexes are the CPI and the IPD, and if
the CPI reports a larger rate of price change, then a variant of
equation Ala expresses the long-term gap in inflation rates:
CPI'
Ar = -s I -1 (Eq. A2a)
Some simplification makes this equation more manageable:
-s1C P It IPDs (Eq. A2b)
, IPD CPIs
Applying the same algebraic transformations from equations Alc
through Alh transforms equation A2b into an elegant approximation
of Ar:
In CPI• IPDs')
Ar IPD CP'S (Eq. A2c)
t-S
Plugging CPI and IPD data for 1974 and 2001 into equation A2a
yields a Ar of 0.00854051. By comparison, the approximation
provided by equation A2c reports a Ar of 0.00850424. After twenty-
seven years, the difference between equation A2a's precise but
awkward result and equation A2c's elegant approximation is less than
a tenth of a percentage point.
B. Fixed-Weight Versus Chain-Type Measures of Growth
Table 3 provides three categories of information: nominal versus
real gross domestic product, annual rates of growth in real GDP, and
fixed-weight and chain-type, annual-weighted indexes of real GDP.
Mathematical explanations of all three categories follow.
(1) Real versus nominal gross domestic product
For any given year t, nominal GDP is expressed as
GDP," = I ptq, (Eq. Bla)
where p represents the price of each commodity in the economy and
q represents the quantity of that commodity that is produced. R,. al
GDP in year t, measured in dollars having a purchasing power
observed in base year b, is expressed as
GDPtr = , pbq (Eq. Blb)
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(2) Annual rates of growth in real GDP
Table 3 reports two measures of annual growth in real GDP: a
fixed-weight measure and a chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal
Index. Two subcomponents of the Fisher Ideal Index-namely, the
Laspeyres index and the Paasche index-are also reported.
(a) Fixed-weight growth rate
For any given year t, the fixed-weight growth rate in real GDP is
determined by dividing real GDP for year t by real GDP for the
preceding year, t - 1. By this measure, growth in real GDP is
expressed as
AGDP/-GDP,r _ pbq,
AGDP, = D pbq (Eq. B2a)GDP,, lpbqt.1
(b) Chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal Index
The Fisher Ideal Index is the geometric mean of two fixed-weight
indexes, the Laspeyres quantity index and the Paasche quantity index.
The Laspeyres quantity index uses the prices observed in the earlier
of two years being studied to weight quantities from both years. The
Paasche quantity index uses prices from the later year. For any given
year t beyond the first year in a study period, the Laspeyres quantity
index is expressed as
Q1= Fpt-Iq_ 1 (Eq. B2b)
Ept- iqt- 1
The Paasche quantity index is expressed as
Q = ptqt 1 (Eq. B2c)
Y-ptq,- 1
The Fisher Ideal quantity index, being the geometric mean of the
Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, is expressed as
Qf = ,(Qt + 1). (Qp + 1)- (Eq. B2d)
(3) Indexes of growth in real GDP.
Table 3 reports both a fixed-weight index of growth real GDP
expressed in year b dollars and a corresponding real GDP growth
index based on chain-type annual weights.
The fixed-weight index for year t is expressed as
GXfw = 100. GDP' = 100. Epoqt (Eq. B3a)
GDPb Ypbqb
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where GX represents an index of growth in real GDP and the
superscript f' designates fixed-weight methodology.
Computing an index of growth in real GDP based on chain-type
annual weights requires two distinct steps. First, starting with the
second year in the time series being studied, real GDP for each year
must be recomputed. Real GDP for year t (designated as GDPt )
equals the chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal quantity index for
that year times real GDP for year t - 1:
GDPf = GDP'f .(1 + Qf ) (Eq. B3b)
Once real GDP has been thus recomputed, its value in test year t and
in base year b can be substituted for the corresponding values for
those years reported by the fixed-weight measure of real GDP in
equation B3a. The chain-type (Fisher) index of growth in real GDP
is therefore expressed as
GXcf = 100- GDPc (Eq. B3c)GD P
C. Fixed-Weight Versus Chain-Type Measures of Inflation
Table 3 provides inflation information in three stages: the test
year price of a base year market basket, annual inflation rates, and
fixed-weight and chain-type, annual-weighted price indexes. These
categories of information correspond to the GDP and growth
information described in part C of this mathematical appendix.
Mathematical explanations follow.
(1) Test year price of a base year market basket.
We return to the definition of nominal GDP for a base year b.
Cf. Eq. Bla. The nominal price of a base year market basket is
equivalent to the nominal GDP for the base year:
MBb = GDP" = Ypbqb (Eq. Cla)
The test year price of a base year market basket is the price-
oriented equivalent of real GDP (which is computed by varying test
year quantities relative to base year quantities). By holding base year
quantities constant instead of base year prices, we can compute the
test year price of a base year market basket in lieu of real GDP.
MBt = Yptqb (Eq. Clb)
(2) Annual inflation rates.
In addition to measures of annual growth in real GDP, Table 3
also reports a fixed-weight measure of inflation and a chain-type
annual-weighted Fisher Ideal price index. Two subcomponents of the
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Fisher Ideal Index-the Laspeyres index and the Paasche index-can
likewise reflect changes in price rather than quantity.
(a) Fixed-weight inflation rate.
For any given year t, the fixed-weight inflation rate is determined
by dividing the price of a base year market basket in year t dollars by
the price of that market basket in dollars for preceding year, t - 1. By
this measure, growth in the price of the base year market basket is
expressed as
AM =MB, _ pfqb
AMB = MB, - q (Eq. C2a)MB,_I  YEA - 1qb
(b) Chain-type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal Index.
The Fisher Ideal price index is the geometric mean of the
Laspeyres price index and the Paasche price index. The Laspeyres
price index uses the quantities observed in the earlier of two years
being studied to weight prices from both years. The Paasche price
index uses quantities from the later year.
For any given year t beyond the first year in a study period, the
Laspeyres price index is expressed as
p1- ptq,- -1 (Eq. C2b)
pt- 1q,- I
The Paasche price index is expressed as
pp _ = ptqt 1 (Eq. C2c)
I Y01- lqt
The Fisher Ideal price index, being the geometric mean of the
Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes, is expressed as
Pt f = V(Ptl + 1)'-(e p + 1) -1 (Eq. C2d)
(3) Price indexes.
Table 3 reports both a fixed-weight price index reflecting a year
b market basket and a corresponding chain-type annual-weighted
price index.
The fixed-weight index for year t is expressed as
PXf = 100 MBt = 100. lptqb (Eq. C3a)
MBb lpbqb
where PX represents a price index and the superscript fw designates
fixed-weight methodology.
Computing a price index based on chain-type annual weights
requires two distinct steps. First, starting with the second year in the
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time series being studied, the price and amount of the commodities in
the market basket must be recomputed for each year. The total price
of the market basket in year t (designated as MBI) equals the chain-
type annual-weighted Fisher Ideal price index for that year times the
price of the market basket in year t - 1:
MB - MBCf . (1 + Pt) (Eq. C3b)
Once the market basket has been thus repriced, its value in test year t
and in base year b can be substituted for the corresponding values for
those years reported by the fixed-weight measure of real GDP in
equation B3a. The chain-type, annual-weighted Fisher price index is
therefore expressed as
PXcf = 100. MBc (Eq. C3c)MBbr
(4) The "dual property" of the Fisher Ideal price and quantity indexes
The Fisher Ideal index, in either of its manifestations, exhibits a
"dual property" that makes it very easy to derive a price index from
its corresponding quantity index and vice versa. Dividing the change
in nominal-dollar expenditures over any period by one Fisher Ideal
Index (quantity or price) yields the opposite index. This relationship
is expressed in the following equation:
100 1O0 ) GDP, (Eq. C4a)
Let us prove this proposition in a simpler form: the ratio between the
nominal gross domestic product of a test year to nominal gross
domestic product of a base year is the product of the Fisher Ideal
price and quantity indexes for those years. In other words, I propose
to show the following relationship:
GDP" = pf .Qf (Eq. C4b)
GDP
Nominal GDP for any period is merely the sum of the product of all
prices and quantities. We can therefore re-express the ratio of test
year GDP to base year GDP as follows:
GDPt" _ p, q,GDP,"- Ypb (Eq. C4c)GDPb"' pbq b
Let us now restate in simple terms the components of the Fisher Ideal
price and quantity indexes, excluding the chaining complexities
involved in producing a time series and excluding also the convention
of expressing these indexes so that their base year values equal 100.
We begin by restating the Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes:
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P = pPqb (Eq. C4d)
YPbqb
PP =Ypq- (Eq. C4e)EPbq,
Let us also restate the Laspeyres and Paasche quantity indexes in
similar fashion:
Q1 - Y, bq, (Eq. C4f)7-Pbqo
QP - qt (Eq. C4g)
Y-Ptqb
Recall that the Fisher Ideal index for price or quantity is merely the
geometric mean of its corresponding Laspeyres or Paasche index.
This enables us to restate the formulas for the Fisher Ideal price and
quantity indexes:
pf = J-.pP = qb -P tqt (Eq. C4h)
Y'Pbqb Pbqt
Qf = .QP= [Y-Pqt .ptqt (Eq. C4i)Y-ZPbqb I'Pt qb
Multiplying the Fisher Ideal price index by the Fisher Ideal quantity
index yields the following equation:
pf .Qf = _ pq, A PPbq (Eq. C4j)
Y'Pbqb Y-Pbq Y-Pbqb XPtqb
Fully expanding the factors on the right side of this equation reveals
some computationally convenient clusters:
pf .Qf =Xptqt P~tq q -Pb qt
= p q q Y (E q. 
C4k)
The last two factors, of course, equal 1. Simplifying equation C4k
reveals that it is equivalent to equation C4c:
pf.Qf 9Pq, GDP,"
P -= -GDP (Eq. C41)YP b qb G DPb
Q.E.D.
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Legal Appendix
A. Uses of the Consumer Price Index and Its Derivatives in Federal
Statutory Law
Individual entitlement programs-determining eligibility and benefit levels
1. 7 U.S.C. § 2014: eligibility to receive benefits under the Food
Stamp Program.
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1712a: limits on multifamily housing loans by the
Federal Housing Administration.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1087rr: application of the CPI within an annually
revised table of income protection allowances within federal
student assistance programs.
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1134b: stipends under the Jacob K. Javits
fellowship program.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1135d: institutional allowances for each individual
receiving graduate assistance in needy areas.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 2007: stipends under the Harry S Truman
Memorial Scholarship program.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 415: cost-of-living allowances within the Social
Security Act.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 907a: requirement that the National Commission
on Social Security investigate "the need to develop a special
Consumer Price Index for the elderly, including the financial
impact that such an index would have on on the costs of the
programs established under the Social Security Act."
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f: "cap amount[s]" on payments for hospice
care provided by or under arrangements made by a hospice
program.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-5: "trigger level[s]" for reductions in
payments "for inpatient hospital services or post-hospital
extended care services furnished an individual in a religious
nonmedical health care institution."
11. 42 U.S.C. § 13951: adjustments in fee schedules for clinical
diagnostic laboratory tests.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m: payment rules governing durable medical
equipment.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u, 1395x: statewide or areawide fee
schedules and other payment rules governing ambulance
services.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss: limitations on "high deductible features"
in group benefits packages.
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15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww: definition of reasonable direct costs for
providing graduate medical education for each full-time-
equivalent resident.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8: outpatient payments for single source
drugs or innovator multiple source drugs.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1758: eligibility for free and reduced price school
lunches.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3796: death benefits for public safety officers
who have "died as the direct and proximate result
of... personal injur[ies] sustained in the line of duty."
19. 42 U.S.C. § 5026: consideration of CPI-U in financial
assistance to applicants to the National Senior Volunteer
Corps.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 5174: limits on federal disaster assistance to
individuals and households.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6865: limits on weatherization assistance for low-
income persons.
Grants to state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and to selected
nonprofit organizations-determining eligibility and benefit levels
22. 7 U.S.C. § 940d: appropriations for hardship loans under
federal rural electrification and telephone service programs.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 6333: determination of poverty levels in
elementary and secondary schools elgible to receive federal
grants to local educational agencies.
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1621a: thresholds for "reimbursement for the
cost of treatment from the Indian Catastrophic Health
Emergency Fund."
25. 29 U.S.C. § 720: grants to states for meeting the costs of
vocational rehabilitation services.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2852: definition of "low-income level[s]" for
purposes of alloting activity grants for disadvantaged youth.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 2852: definition of "low-income level[s]" for
purposes of alloting activity grants for dislocated workers.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 6903: limitations on payments to local
governments for entitlement land transferred from a state.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 2324: reduced pricing for water supply storage
provided by the Secretary of the Army to low-income
communities.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 256e: payments per resident to children's
hospitals that operate approved graduate medical residency
training programs.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 294c: grants or contracts "for the establishment
or operation of geriatric education centers."
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32. 42 U.S.C. § 658a: incentive payments to states for meeting
performance level targets within federal programs regarding
child support and the establishment of paternity.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1308: adjustments according to the medical care
component of CPI-U in additional grants under the Social
Security Act to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and
American Samoa.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-22: grants to states to support the design,
establishment, and operation of infrastructure in support of
disabled workers.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b: threshold for approval by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services of contracts by states for, inter
alia, inpatient hospital services.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4: definition of a "disproportionate share
hospital" allotment in order to facilitate limits on payments
to states for approved medical assistance programs.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1759a: payment rates for school breakfasts and
lunches.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1761: grants-in-aids and other payments to states
for the initiation and maintenance of summer nonprofit food
service programs for children in service institutions.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1766: institutional reimbursement for meals
under the federal child and adult care food program provided
by a family or group day care home sponsoring organization.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1769: reimbursement under child nutrition pilot
projects in school districts offering milk that meets federal
fortification requirements for low-fat, skim, and other forms
of fluid milk.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 5189: threshold for using a simplified procedure
for computing the federal contribution to a state or local
government or a private nonprofit organization for the
repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a
damaged or destroyed public facility or private nonprofit
facility.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9832: definition of the "poverty line" in the
administration of the Head Start program.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9835: appropriations within the Head Start
program.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9902: definition of the "poverty line" in the
administration of the community services block grant
program.
45. U.S.C. § 12899d: limits on returns realized by profit-
motivated partners in a nonprofit partnership receiving
Youthbuild assistance for a rental housing project.
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46. 42 U.S.C. § 15022, 15042: allotments to state councils on
developmental disabilities.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15062, 15066: five-year grants to University
Centers for Excellence in Developmental Disabilities
Education, Research, and Service.
48. 49 U.S.C. § 47115: discretionary withholding of airport
subsidies based on information regarding a local government's
use of airport revenues and aviation fuel taxes to pay for
airport expenses growing faster than the inflation rate reported
by CPI-U.
Management of federal public lands and other federal property
49. 10 U.S.C. § 2828: maximum lease amounts for the rental of
military family housing in foreign countries.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 460d-3: recreational user fees at developed
recreation sites and facilities operated by the Army Corps of
Engineers.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 497c: rental charges for ski area permits within
National Forest lands.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 5954: valuation of the leasehold surrender interest
in any capital improvement constructed by a concessionaire
upon land owned by the United States within the National Park
System.
53. 30 U.S.C. § 28j: adjustment of fees required under the Federal
Lands Policy and Management Act, including the claim
maintenance fee charged "the holder of each unpatented
mining claim, mill, or tunnel site."
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1350: penalties for violations of leases, licenses,
or permits relating to submerged lands on the Outer
Continental Shelf.
55. 50 U.S.C. § 167d: prices on crude helium sales by the federal
government.
Pay and benefits for federal employees (including active military personnel,
military veterans, and officers of the United States)
56. 2 U.S.C. § 802: salaries of the Director and Regional Directors
of the Congressional Award Program.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 5303: mandatory consideration by the President of
multiple economic measures-including but not limited to the
CPI, the Producer Price Index, and the IPD-in a
determination of "an economic condition affecting the general
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welfare that may make [a] pay adjustment [for federal
employees] inappropriate."
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101, 8146a: death and disability benefits for
federal employees.
59. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331, 8340, 8401, 8462: retirement benefits for
federal employees.
60. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401a, 1436: retired pay and annuities awarded to
members and former members of the military.
61. 10 U.S.C. § 16131: educational assistance benefits for members
of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve of the armed
forces.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1427: salaries for directors of federal home loan
banks.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 2209: compensation limit for directors of banks
within the Farm Credit System.
64. 37 U.S.C. § 403b: cost-of-living allowances for eligible
members of the uniformed services.
65. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3015, 3564, 3687: educational assistance
allowances for veterans (including apprenticeships,
correspondence courses, and special training).
66. 38 U.S.C. § 3108: subsistence allowances for veterans with
service-connected disabilities.
67. 40 U.S.C. § 18303: requirement that the CPI for the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area be considered in any
arbitration award involving the employees of an interstate
compact agency operating in the national capital area.
Triggers and jurisdictional thresholds (including exemptions and liability limits)
68. 2 U.S.C. § 1603: income thresholds requiring the registration of
lobbyists.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 7342: triennial redefinition of the threshold for
excluding foreign gifts and declarations of "minimal value"
from federal employees' reporting obligations.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 2808: exemption from home mortgage disclosure
obligations otherwise governing lenders.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 4108: mandatory comparison of monthly
residential rates with the CPI as a precondition to the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development's approval of "a plan of
action that provides for termination of low-income affordability
restrictions through prepayment of [a] mortgage or voluntary
termination of [a] mortgage insurance contract."
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72. 15 U.S.C. § 1602: definition of mortgages covered by the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 2704: limits on liability and removal costs
under the Oil Pollution Act.
74. 49 U.S.C. § 33105: limits on compliance costs that the
Secretary of Transportation may impose on motor vehicle
manufacturers under the Secretary's motor vehicle theft
prevention program.
Income taxation
75. I.R.C. § 1: indexing of federal income tax brackets.
76. I.R.C. § 162: conditions on the deductibility of equipment
maintenance allowances paid under post-1991 collective
bargaining agreements between the United States Postal
Service and the National Rural Letter Carriers.
77. I.R.C. § 213: medical care cost adjustment of long-term care
premiums.
78. I.R.C. § 280F: use of the automobile component of the CPI
to limit the amount of depreciation that can be deducted in
any taxable year for a luxury automobile.
79. I.R.C. § 474: use of the CPI as an alternative to the Producer
Price Index by certain small businesses electing to use the
simplified dollar-value method of pricing inventories under
last in, first out tax accounting.
80. I.R.C. § 1274A: adjustment of the threshold for special rules
for debt instruments whose stated principal amount does not
exceed $2.8 million in 1988 dollars.
81. I.R.C. § 7872: threshold for special tax treatment of below-
market loans to a qualified continuing care facility.
82. I.R.C. § 9704: adjustment of annual contributions by
assigned coal operators to the United Mine Workers of
America Combined Benefit Fund.
Fees for federal services
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1356: premium fee for employment-based
petitions and applications before the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1113: processing fees for trademark registration
and other services provided by the Patent and Trademark
Office relating to commercial marks.
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2: assessments on the Student Loan
Marketing Association "in amounts sufficent to provide for
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reasonable costs and expenses of carrying out the duties of
the Secretary of the Treasury."
86. 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g, 379h: user fees from applications for the
approval of human drugs by the Food and Drug
Administration.
87. 21 U.S.C. §§ 379i, 379j: user fees from applications for the
approval of medical devices by the Food and Drug
Administration.
88. 35 U.S.C. § 41: fees for patent applications and patent and
trademark search systems operated by the Patent and
Trademark Office.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e: administrative fees payable by any state
that has entered an agreement under which the
Commissioner of Social Security will make supplementary
payments to individuals on behalf of that state or a political
subdivision.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 158: license application fees before the Federal
Communications Commission.
91. 49 U.S.C. § 45302: fees for certain airman certficates, aircraft
registration certificates, and processing forms for major
repairs and alterations of fuel tanks and aircraft fuel systems.
Civil penalties and claims by the United States government
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1194: penalties for violations of Consumer Product
Safety Commission rules and standards regarding fabric
flammability.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1264: penalties for violations of prohibitions on
hazardous substances.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2069: penalties for knowing violations of consumer
product safety prohibitions.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3717: cost-of-living adjustments in lieu of interest
and penalties on administrative claims of the United States.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 262: penalties for violations of regulations
governing biological products.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7651j: penalties for excessive emissions of sulfur
dioxide or nitrogen oxides.
Federally mandated insurance for private entities
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1422: adjustments in the $500 million asset limit for
depository institutions insured by the Federal Home Loan
Bank.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 2732: application of the CPI for Anchorage to
mandatory contributions by terminal facilities and crude oil
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tankers to environmental oversight and monitoring programs in
Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, Alaska.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2210: premiums under the Price-Anderson Act for
liability insurance at federally licensed nuclear power plants.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1: deposits into and special assessments for
the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund
Regulation of private economic conduct (including campaign contributions,
public utility rates, and copyright royalties)
102. 2 U.S.C. § 441a: limits on contributions and expenditures in
federal election campaigns.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1104: definition of dollar amounts stipulated
throughout the Bankruptcy Code.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 683: maximum leverage available to small business
investment companies licensed by the Small Business
Administration.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j: annual increases in the maximum amount
of a "reasonable charge" that a consumer reporting agency
may impose for making a disclosure to the consumer.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 3603: for purposes of federal regulation of
abusive conversions of condominiums and residential
cooperatives, treating the use of a consumer price index in a
real estate lease as a component of an "automatic rent
increase clause."
107. 17 U.S.C. § 1004: maximum royalties on digital audio recording
devices.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 623: safe harbor under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act for employers who reduce long-term
disability benefits in the event of certain contingencies and
consistent with the medical component of CPI-U.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7651o: pricing of air pollution allowances under the
Clean Air Act.
State administration of federal programs-reporting obligations, caps on
administrative expenses, and other conditions
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1411: limits on state administrative expenses in
providing "special education and related services to children
with disabilities."
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1: limits on the discretion of the states to
adjust income standards for eligibility for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families.
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112. 2 U.S.C. § 7511a: threshold for waivers for hydrocarbon and
NO, emission-related motor vehicle repairs under state
enforcement of the Clean Air Act.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a: threshold amount per ton of regulated
pollutants that states must collect in order to secure approval of
their implementation plans under the Clean Air Act.
114. 49 U.S.C. § 47107: comparison of airport fees charged by
Hawaii with the CPI for Honolulu in order to effect
reductions of a maximum revenue ceiling on a statutory
arrangement allowing Hawaii to apply revenue from off-
airport sales of duty-free merchandise to airport road
construction.
Limits on administrative expenses incurred by federal agencies; miscellaneous
obligations imposed on federal administrative agencies
115. 16 U.S.C. § 669c: limits on expenses for the administration of
wildlife restoration plans by the Secretary of the Interior.
116. 16 U.S.C. § 777c: limits on expenses for the administration of
fish restoration plans by the Secretary of the Interior.
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1015: mandatory comparison of tuition and fees
with "the consumer price index and other appropriate
measures of inflation" in the Commissioner of Education
Statistics' "national study of expenditures at institutions of
higher education."
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1419: obligation of the Secretary of Education to
include CPI information in annual reports of each state's
federal grants for preschool education..
119. 38 U.S.C. § 8126: prices paid for drugs procured by the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s: prices paid for pediatric vaccines under
contracts by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
121. 47 U.S.C. § 396: annual appropriation for administrative
expenses incurred by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
Formulation of macroeconomic policy
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1022: definition of the terms "inflation,"
"prices," and "reasonable price stability" for purposes of the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3152.
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B. Uses of the Implicit Price Deflator in Federal Statutory Law
Individual entitlement programs-determining eligibility and benefit levels
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr: exclusion from payments for dialysis
service benefits in the Social Security Administration's end
stage renal disease program.
Foreign aid
2. 48 U.S.C. § 1681 note: aid under compacts of free association
with Palau and with the Federated States of Micronesia and the
Marshall Islands.
3. 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note: aid under a covenant of political union
with the Northern Mariana Islands, adjusted according to the
"United States Department of Commerce composite price
index."
4. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804: exclusion of inflation-based
adjustments in direct grant assistance to the Northern Mariana
Islands.
Note: Neither the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of
America nor the pair of provisions governing direct grant assistance
to the Northern Mariana Islands uses the term "implicit price
deflator."
Pay and benefits for federal employees (including active military personnel,
military veterans, and officers of the United States)
5. 2 U.S.C. § 59: amounts paid for "furniture, equipment, and
other office furnishings" for Senators' home state offices.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 5303: mandatory consideration by the President of
multiple economic measures-including but not limited to the
CPI, the Producer Price Index, and the IPD-in a
determination of "an economic condition affecting the general
welfare that may make [a] pay adjustment [for federal
employees] inappropriate."
Fees for federal services
7. 7 U.S.C. § 473a: fees charged for cotton classification services
made available to cotton producers by the Department of
Agriculture.
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Management of federal public lands and other federal property
8. 16 U.S.C. § 6213: transitional user fee charged to cabin owners
under the Forest Service System's recreation residence
program, pending the implementation of 16 U.S.C. § 6207.
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1337: royalties on "oil and gas lease[s] on
submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf."
Income taxation
10. I.R.C. § 29: tax credit for unconventional fuels.
11. I.R.C. § 43: enhanced oil recovery tax credit.
12. I.R.C. § 45: renewable electricity production tax credit.
Federally mandated insurance for private entities
13. I.R.C. § 4980B: computation of continuation coverage
requirements governing group health plans.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1164: applicable premiums for continuation
coverage of qualified beneficiaries under a group health plan
that is a self-insured plan under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Program.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-4: applicable premiums for continuation
coverage of qualified beneficiaries under "a self-insured plan
under state and local governmental group health plans."
Formulation of macroeconomic policy
16. 2 U.S.C. § 900: definition of "[t]he term 'real economic
growth,' for the purpose of budget enforcement and deficit
reduction through sequestration, [as] the growth in the gross
national product during such fiscal year, adjusted for
inflation, consistent with Department of Commerce
definitions. Note: This statute does not use the term
"implicit price deflator."
17. 2 U.S.C. § 907: adoption, for purposes of adjusting all
budgetary resources except those "relating to personnel"
within the budget of the United States, of "the percent by
which the average of the estimated gross domestic product
chain-type price index for that fiscal year differs from the
average of such estimated index for the current year." Note:
This statute does not use the term "implicit price deflator."
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C. Uses of Other Specified Price Indexes in Federal Statutory Law
Grants to state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and to selected
nonprofit organizations-determining eligibility and benefit levels
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1755: adjustment of the "national average value"
of foods donated under the School Lunch Program according
to "5 major food components in the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
Producer Price Index (cereal and bakery products, meats,
poultry and fish, dairy products, processed fruits and
vegetables, and fats and oils").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1772: minimum reimbursement for half-pints of
milk served in schools and other eligible institutions, adjusted
each school year according to "the Producer Price Index for
Fresh Processed Milk."
Management of federal public lands and other federal property
3. 16 U.S.C. § 6207: annual adjustments in cabin user fees
charged under the Forest System Recreation Residence
Program according to the Department of Agriculture's Index
of Agricultural Land Prices, with a provision allowing the
Secretary of Agriculture "[n]ot later than 10 years after
October 11, 2000,... [to] select and use [a different]
index.., if the Secretary determines that a different index
better reflects change in the value of a lot over time."
4. 43 U.S.C. § 1905: annual adjustments in the grazing fee on
public rangelands according to three indexes derived from
data collected by various offices within the Department of
Agriculture-the Forage Value Index, the Beef Cattle Price
Index, and the Prices Paid Index.
Regulation of private economic conduct (including campaign contributions,
public utility rates, and copyright royalties)
5. 12 U.S.C. § 4611: instruction that the Director of the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight adopt a risk-based
capital test that accounts for changes over time in the ratio of
a mortgage's unpaid principal balance to the value of the
property by which the mortgage is secured, relative the "the
Constant Quality Home Price Index published by the
Secretary of Commerce (or any index of similar quality,
authority, and public availability that is regularly used by the
Federal Government)."
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Formulation of macroeconomic policy
6. 2 U.S.C. § 907: adoption of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Employment Cost Index for the purpose of "adjust[ing]
budgetary resources relating to personnel" within the budget of
the United States.
D. References to Unspecified Price Indexes in Federal Statutory Law
Foreign aid
1. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-33: adjustment of an appropriation "of
$10,800,000 for construction costs of" an international flood
control project for the Tijuana River basin, "based on
estimated June 1976 prices, plus or minus such amounts as may
be justified by reason of price index fluctuations."
Income taxation
2. I.R.C. § 467: safe harbor from Treasury regulations defining
"disqualified leaseback or long-term agreements" for rental
agreements using permitted "changes in amounts paid
determined by reference to price indices."
3. I.R.C. § 472: requirement of Treasury regulations
"permitting the use of suitable published governmental
indexes" in taxpayers' last-in, first-out inventories.
Regulation of private economic conduct (including campaign contributions,
public utility rates, and copyright royalties)
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-10: permission for the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to insure mortgages and
loans making proper use of "a selected price index."
5. 49 U.S.C. § 13701: "zone of reasonableness" for rates
charged by "motor carrier[s] for service in noncontiguous
domestic trade or water carrier[s] for port-to-port service in
that trade, as assessed against changes in "the Producers
Price Index" [sic].
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